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TRADE AND JUSTICE: LINKING THE TRADE 
LINKAGE DEBATES 
FRANK}. GARCIA* 
"!think we get very tangled up when we say, 'What is our hu­
man rights policy and how does it interact with our trade policy? . . . I 
do not believe that human rights should be a key element of trade pol-. ,1 
tcy .... 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the linkage between international trade and 
various other aspects of social life and concern, or as it is com­
monly referred to, the "trade and __ " phenomenon, has been the 
subject of increasing attention within academic and policy circles. 2 
• Frank J. Garcia, Assistant Professor, Florida State University ("FSU") 
College of Law. This Article is a revised version, in essay form, of a paper pre­
sented by the author at a conference entitled, "Linkages as a Phenomenon: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach," sponsored by the American Society of Interna­
tional Law's International Economic Law Interest Group in December, 1997. 
The author would like to thank the conference participants for their valuable 
insights, and his colleagues Paolo Annino, Lois Sheph.erd, and Jim Rossi for 
their comments on earher drafts of this Article. Work on this Article was sup­
ported by a summer grant from the FSU College of Law. This Article is a pre­
liminary reflection undertaken as part of a larger inquiry into the relationship 
between political philosophy and contemporary international economic law, 
begun wh.ile the author was a Fulbright Scholar in the srring of 1997 in Uru­
guay. The author would like to thank Dr. Oscar Sarlo o the University of the 
Republic in Montevideo, Uruguay, for his invaluable support and insight dur­
ii_lg the early stages of this prOJeCt, and the Fulbright Commission for its finan­
Clal support. 
1 Claudia Dreifus, Ready for Takeoff, N.Y. TIMES , Aug. 17, 1997, § 6 
(Mafazine), at 30 (quoting Philip M. Condit, C.E.O., Boeing Company). 
Trade linkage is not a new phenomenon, J?articularly with regard to the 
link between trade and labor standards. See Virgmia Leary, Workers R ights and 
International Trade, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 175, 182-85 
(Tagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996) (examining the link between 
domestic labor standards and international competitiveness asserted in nine­
teenth century labor reform debates); Frieder Roessler, Domestic Policy Objec­
tives and the Multilateral Trade Order, in THE WTO AS AN lNTERJ."'l'A TIONAL 
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·The response from the trade community to such linkages has not 
been one of unalloyed welcome. 3 However, rather than respond 
to the multitude of issues and problems being l inked to trade in 
ORGANIZATION 213 (Anne 0. Krueger ed., 1998), reprinted in 19 U. PA. J. 
INT'L EcoN. L. 201 (1998) (noting links between employment, balance of pay­
ments issues, and fair labor standards recognized in 1947-48 conference leading 
to the Havana Charter and in the Charter itselQ. However, in the last five 
years the literature devoted to these and other linkages has mushroomed, with 
the trade and environment link arguably leading the way. See, e.g. , DANIEL C. 
ESTY, GREENING THE GATT (1994); Steve Charnovitz, Free TYade, Fair TYadeJ 
Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 459 (1994). Other 
recognized or asserted linkage fields include: human rights, see, e.g. , James F. 
Smith, NAFTA and Human Rights: A Necessary Linkage, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
793 (1994); Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement 
Mechanism for Basic Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade 
Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT 'L L & POL'Y 1 (1996), development, see} e.g. , 
Bartram S. Brown, Develo�ing Countries in the International Trade Order, 14 N. 
ILL U. L. REV. 347 (1994 , competition law, see, e.g. , Eleanor M. Fox, Toward 
World A ntitrust and Mar et Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1997), intellectual 
property, see, e.g. , Frank J. Garcia, Protection of Intellectual Property R ights in the 
North A merican Free Trade Agreement: A Successful Case of Regional Trade Regu­
lation, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 817 (1993), and culture, see, e.g. , John 
David Donaldson, "Television Without FrontiersJJ: The Continuing Tension Be­
tween Liberal Free Trade and European Cultural Integrity, 20 FORDHAM INT'L 
L.J. 90 (1996); W. Ming Shao, Is There No Business Like Show Business? Free Trade 
and Cultural Protectionism, 20 YALE J. INT 'L L. 105 (1995), to name a few. See 
generally Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade andJJ: Recent Developments in Trade Policy 
and Scholarship-And Their Surprising Political Implications, 17 Nw. J. INT 'L L. 
& Bus. 759 (1996-97) (assessing recent linkage scholarship). 
3 Some links, like investment and intellectual property, have been readily 
received by the trade community, as is evidenced by their inclusion in modern 
trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
("NAFTA"), see North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, chs. 
11, 17, 32 LL.M. 639, 670, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures ("TRIMS") and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
("TRIPS"), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND vol. 31; 33 LL.M. 81 (1994). However, other links to areas such as the 
environment, human rights, and competition law are resisted, see} e.g.1 Steve 
Charnovitz, The World Trade Organ ization and Social Issues, 28 J. WORLD 
TRADE 17, 24 (1994) ("The issues of environment and labour are often reviewed 
rather negatively by the trade camp."); Fox, supra note 2, at 10-12 (noting that 
the United States resists the linkage between trade and antitrust law); Smith, 
supra note 2, at 806-17 (charting U.S. reluctance to embrace disciplined unilat­
eral human rights linkages); Spencer W. Waller, The Internationalization of A n­
titrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343, 344-45 (1987) (noting that interna­
tional attempts at integrated transnational comoetition law are generally 
ineffective, with the United States playing an ambtvalent role), and cautionary 
notes are sounded about linkage in general. See, e.g. , Roessler, supra note 2, at 
14-15 (arguing that such linkages undermine both the trade order and attain­
ment of the desired domestic policy objectives). 
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the manner that a ship captain might rail against a sudden increase 
in barnacles,4 the trade law and policy community should wel­
come this abundance as a sign of the increasing prevalence and 
impact of trade law throughout all aspects of the societies of coun­
tries engaged in trade, economic integration, and international 
economic relations generally. This dramatic increase in the quan­
tity, scope and reach of international economic law is often re­
ferred to as the '"international economic law revolution,"'5 and 
the trade linkage phenomenon is one aspect of it. 
As international economic law increases in scope and effect, it 
will become increasingly important to define which issues, prob­
lems, and questions are legitimately within its jurisdiction, and 
how such issues are to be decided. As international economic re­
lations grow more sophisticated, cooperative, and legalized, the 
rules and decisions of international economic law encroach more 
and more on other areas of social concern, such as environmental 
protection, labor law, development assistance, and non-economic 
human rights. Are these other areas of concern alien to interna­
tional economic law, and are the linkages and conflicts among 
these issues and traditional trade law and policy mere " border 
conflicts," conflicts at the margin? Or are they central, even con­
stitutive, of modern international economic law? And how shall 
these issues and conflicts be decided? 
It is in this context that recognition of the role of justice in in­
ternational economic law can make a contribution to the analysis 
of the "trade and " debates. A re-examination of the classical 
roots of the Western concept of justice, i . e. ,  Justice as Right Or­
der,6 and the relationship between justice, or morality generally, 
4 Roessler exhibits a note of weary frustration by stating: 
Many of the proposals to pursue environmental objectives through the 
multilateral trade order have features that resemble those of past failed 
linkages between trade policy instruments and domestic policy objec­
tives. Again proposals are made that would permit the use of trade 
measures in the pursuit of policy objectives that cannot be attained ef­
ficiently with trade policy instruments. And, again, the hoped-for 
cross-fertilization is hkely to turn into cross-contamination. 
Roessler, supra note 2, at 15 (emphasis added). 
5 See Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution, 17 U. 
PA. J. INT'LECON. L. 33 , 36 (1996). 
6 This Article confines itself to the moral and political tradition that traces 
its ancestry to classical Greece. Outside of the West, other traditions explore 
fundamental questions of social order under different rubrics, such as li or 
dharma. See generally SURYA P. SINHA, LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY AND 
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and law, suggests that, in fact, we must consider the claims of jus­
tice when we try to talk about international economic law. 
Moreover, as this Article will seek to illustrate, certain problems 
in international economic relations, including trade linkage prob­
lems, can usefully be examined as problems involving the often 
conflicting claims of justice in the context of international eco-. 1 7 nomiC aw. 
Section Two of this Article introduces the concept of justice as 
a sort of "linkage" itself, joining order with value in legal and so­
cial thought, and outlines how justice as "Right Order" is related 
to the analysis of international economic law. 8 Section Three ap­
plies this view to the "trade and __ " debate, suggesting how such 
an analysis could contribute to our understanding of trade linkage 
problems. As the title of this Article suggests, such an examina­
tion reveals that the question of justice is actually implicit in the 
many "trade and __ " linkages currently under discussion. U n­
derstanding how this is so may contribute to improving the ques­
tions being asked, and perhaps suggest what the answers might 
look like. 
2. JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
2.1. justice as Right Order 
In the Western tradition, thinking about justice and its rela­
tion to law is as old as organized political life, indeed as old as the 
tradition itself.9 In Protagoras, Plato writes that a sense of justice 
INTER.l\IA TIONAL LAW (1996) (surveying Western, Chinese, Indian, and African 
approaches to social order). It may be that in these traditions such concepts 
play an analogous role to the concept of justice, linking order to value in social 
life, but that is a question left for another day. 
7 Philip Nichols suggests that many trade disputes, and in particular dis­
putes involving linkage issues, conceal underlying conflicts in societal values. 
See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 658, 659-61 
(1996). 
8 This Article does not develop or adopt a substantive conception of jus­
tice, for example, a Rawlsian conception of justice as fairness. The Article aims, 
rather, to suggest how the concept of justice might function in our analysis of 
international economic law. 
9 See, e.g., CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 191 (2d ed. 1963) (noting that the problem of the 
relation of law to justice is central to the evolution of the philosophy of law). 
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is a prereqmslte to living a civic life, to living in community.10 
Why? Because the non-violent resolution of disputes, a corner­
stone, if not the sine qua non, of civic life, requires that losing par­
ties understand outcomes as "right," as consistent with fundamen-
. 1 11 I h d ". " tal va ues. n ot er wor s, as JUSt. 
Over 2,000 years later, we find social psychologists stating, in 
modern parlance, essentially the same point. Klaus Scherer, in his 
introduction to an interdisciplinary study of justice research, 
writes that justice, understood as social outcomes justified by re­
course to principles accepted by the community, is a basic and in­
dispensable principle for any kind of human social association. 12 
This assertion relies on the grounds that human beings exhibit a 
powerful emotional response to the perception of injustice that no 
social system can afford to ignore. 
The notion of social outcomes, then, is essential to any mean­
ingful concept of justice.13 When we speak of justice, however, 
we speak of social outcomes not in a descriptive sense, but in an 
evaluative or justificatory sense. In other words, we speak of the 
acceptability of outcomes. 14 If we consider an outcome just, we 
consider it acceptable, and its acceptability involves reference to 
particular criteria. Thus our notion of justice is quite closely 
linked conceptually and etymologically to justification. 15 
The particular criteria by which the acceptability of an out­
come is evaluated will depend on the theoretical framework used 
for the analysis, and on the discipline posing the general ques-
10 See PLATO, PROTAGORAS 20-21 (Benjamin Jowett & Martin Ostwald 
trans., Liberal Arts Press 1965). 
11 See id. 
12 See Klaus R. Scherer, Issues in the Study of Justice, in JUSTICE: INTER­
DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 1-14 (Klaus R. Scherer ed. ,  1992) . 
13 In emphasizing social outcomes, this Article does not mean to deny the 
importance to the study of j ustice of the processes of outcome allocation, 
known in law and social psychology as procedural justice, to an overall theory 
of justice. See John Bell, justice and the Law, in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 127 (noting the centrality of procedural justice 
to legal writinp on justice); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural justice Research, 1 Soc. 
JUST. RES . 41 (1987) (surveying contemporary psychological research on proce­
dural justice). 
14 See John Bell & Eric Schokkaert, Interdisciplinary Theory and Research on 
justice, in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 237. 
15 See Scherer, supra note 12, at 2; see also SERGE-CHRISTOPHE KOLM, 
MODERN THEORIES OF JUSTICE 7 (1996) ;  Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Founda­
tions of Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127 (1987) . 
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tion.16 While a social scientist may study the effects of certain 
variables on our evaluations of acceptability, such as the subjective 
influence of social representations on individual perceptions of in­
justice;17 the effects of status, achievement, power, and social 
stratification on the distribution of social goods; 18 or the effects of 
different principles of distribution on the economic system, 19 it 
falls to philosophy, in particular moral and political p hilosophy, 
to articulate the substantive moral principles by which we judge 
the acceptability of individual and social behavior. 
Moral and political philosophy are concerned with the order 
we bring to our social relations, both on the level of individual 
decisions and relationships, and in terms of the basic structure of 
our social institutions.20 Phrased in terms of the acceptability of 
outcomes, moral and p olitical philosophy provide certain modes 
of justification, namely, in terms of moral and political norms, for 
individual decision-making and social organization. 
The classical roots of our tradition of political p hilosophy 
yield two fundamental, related, but significantly different starting 
points on the nature of the concept of justice: the Platonic and 
the Aristotelian.2 1 While neither explicitly replaces the other, and 
16 Disciplines which have studied the question of justice include: philoso­
phy, law, psychology, sociology, and economics. In each discipline, the justifi­
cation of outcomes ts studied in a slightly different aspect. See generally Scherer, 
supra note 12 ,  at 1 1-14 .  
1 7  See Kjell Tornblom, The Social Psychology of Distributive Justice, in 
JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12 ,  at 177-236 
(discussing social psychology). 
18 See Wil Arts & Romke Van der Veen, Sociological Approaches to Distribu­
tive and Procedural justice, in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, su­
pra note 12, at 143-76. 
19 See Erik Schokkaert, The Economics of Distributive justice, Welfare and 
Freedom, in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12,  at 65-
1 13 .  Scherer notes that, normatively, economic analyses of JUStice may advance 
the substantive position that efficiency equals justice. See Scherer, supra note 
12, at 10, 12 .  
20 See WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 6 
(1990) . The distinction, never very clear, between moral and political philoso­
phy can be expressed as follows: moral philosophy concerns the questions of 
what we are to do, and political philosophy concerns that subset of questions 
involving what we are to do when state power and authority are involved. 
21 I am following Rawls in relying on a distinction between the "concept" 
of justice and the many varying "conceptions" of justice, the former consistmg 
of "the role which these different sets of principles, these different conceptions, 
have in common." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5 (1971) . 
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both in fact are complementary, each emphasizes a different as­
pect of justice, and both have had a fundamental influence in 
shaping our culture's investigation of justice.22 
Plato's sense of justice is comprehensive and magisterial. Jus­
tice is �iBht Order, both wit�i?- the individual sou� and wi�hin 
the pohs .- Put another way, 1t 1s the concept of Justice that lmks 
the terms according to which social life is organized with a theory 
f 1 h . "G d "24 Th "R. h " f . d o va ue, or w at 1s oo . e 1g tness o a gtven or er 
depends on the particular relationship of the parts to the whole, 
which depends on other matters including a theory of human na­
ture and a theory of value.25 But the function of the concept of 
justice, independent of the substantive conception, is to link the 
Tom Campbell objects to the concept/ conception distinction regarding 
justice, questioning whether any putative "concept" of justice can truly be neu­
tral regarding substantive principles of justice. See TOM CAMPBELL, JUSTICE 5-
6 (1988). However, in proposing his concept of justice as "treatment in accor­
dance with desert," Campbell reveals that he has blurred the con­
cept/ conception distinction and is, in fact, advancing a substantive conception 
of justice as a concept of justice. !d. In this Article, I have sought to preserve 
this distinction in advancing the concept of justice as Right Order, which I be­
lieve more closely approximates Campbell's own criteria for a neutral func­
tional concept. 
22 See FRIEDRICH, supra note 9, at 26 (crediting Plato and Aristotle with 
together laying the foundation for all subsequent inquiries into law and justice 
in the West). 
23 See id. at 13 (describing the root of Plato's comprehensive concept of jus­
tice in pre-Socratic notions of law as nomos, or sacred custom, which "is the or­
der whiCh embraces all"). 
24 Friedrich acknowledges that for Plato there is a close and essential link 
between law and ethics. See id. at 15, 18; see also HANS KELSEN, WHAT IS 
JUSTICE? 101 (1957) (noting that Platonic justice rests on the idea of the Good). 
25 In other words, the substantive view of justice Plato adopts is a particu­
lar account of the proper order among the elements of society, based on his par­
ticular view of human nature and th.e Good. In Plato's case, the order advo­
cated-his substantive theory of justice-is one of justice as "rational control," 
with the philosopher king at the head; the guardians in between; and the arti­
sans at the bottom. See PLATO, REPUBLIC, 44le-442d, 444d (G.M.A. Gube 
trans., 1992). It is a hierarchy of rational ability and character traits, in which 
each takes the place most fitting for his or her particular constellation of abili­
ties and traits. Those with the more prized of the Greek virtues-valor and ra­
tionality-are accorded pride of place. It is not an egalitarian vision, nor is it 
particularly attractive to a modern audience. 
Later Platonists such as Augustine would modify the nature of the relation­
ships according to more egalitarian principles, while maintaining the funda­
mental Platonic insight that justice is Right Order. See Ernest L. Fortin, St. 
Augustine, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 180-91 (Leo Strauss & Jo­
seph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987). 
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social order to a theory of the desirable state or outcome of social 
relationships. 
26 In oth�r words, the acceptability of the particular 
social order depends on its resemblance to the Good. 27 Thus, for 
Plato,  any question concerning the organization of social life can 
be framed as a question concerning justice. 28 
In contrast, Aristotle 's  analysis of justice, while arguably more 
influential , is somewhat narrower and more technical than 
Plato's . Aristotle's  inquiry into justice begins with a distinction 
between justice in general as the supreme virtue/9 and wecific 
forms of justice, with the latter being his principle interest . Spe­
cific forms of justice and injustice concern aspects of one's social 
relations that involve gain, and whether what one has gained one 
has gained "graspingly" or in proportion to one's proper share. 
Out of this distinction arises the further distinction between 
types of specific justice for which Aristotle is best known: the 
distributive and the corrective.31 Distributive justice is "that 
which is manifested in distributions of honour or  money or  the 
other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share 
in the constitution," which may be allotted among its members in 
equal or unequal shares. 32 This aspect of specific justice thus in­
volves the division of social goods, of goods which can be divided 
26 
s d' . 1 ee 1scuss1on supra note 2 . 
27 See Alan Ryan, Introduction to JUSTICE 15 (Alan Ryan ed., 1993) (stating 
that, for Plato, Justice holds all the other virtues in place, and in this way is a 
mirror for reason itself). 
28 See id. at 7 (stating that, for Socrates, justice is inherent in the organiza­
tion of the whole, whether the whole in question is the individual soul or soci­
ety in general). 
This discussion may have particular relevance in connection with the trade 
and environment debate. See infra notes 109-18 and accompanying text. 
29 Aristotle describes general justice, or justice in the broadest sense, as con­
sisting of all aspects of one's relationship to one's fellows conducted according 
to virtue, and injustice, in this sense, as conducting such relationships in a man­
ner contrary to virtue. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in INTRODUCTION 
TO ARISTOTLE, 300, bk. V, ch. 1 (Richard McKeon ed., 1947) [hereinafter Eth­
ics]. In this characterization of the concept of justice Aristotle is clearly reflect­
ing Plato's views. 
30 See id. at 400-02, bk. V, ch. 2. 
31 Subsequent commentators on justice generally take this distinction as 
their starting point. See Ryan, supra note 27, at 9 (noting that most modern 
writers on justice begin with these two distinctions). It ts less frequently re­
called that this distinction follows the earlier distinction between general, or 
Platonic, justice and specific justice. 
32 See Ethics, supra note 29, at 402, bk. V, ch. 2. 
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or allocated, and which can be divided socially, by custom, opin­
ion, informal decisions, and formal allocative mechanisms.33 In 
order to evaluate a particular division, one need only identify the 
particular conception of justice, the substantive principle3 which would guide such allocative decisions towards a just result. 4 
Corrective justice is a restorative form of justice; of putting 
into balance something that has come out of balance because of an 
injustice.35 It could be considered the elimination of gain from 
acts of injustice.36 If, as a result of voluntary or involuntary deal­
ings with one's fellows, a party ends up with either more or less 
than what is properly its share of the subject of the transaction,37 
Aristotle would say that this is an injustice, and the solution to 
33 The notion of division among members of a group or community, or 
those who "have a share in the constitution," id., raises the question of whether 
this aspect of specific justice applies to any group in which allocation of social 
goods occurs, or if some particular type of social or political link, i.e., one that 
requires a shared constitution or membership in a polity, is a precondition to 
the claims of distributive justice. This issue arises again in the contention that 
distributive justice does not apply to trade agreements because, to the extent 
they affect such allocations, they do so across polities and do not affect mem­
bers of the same polity. Of course, one can argue that trade agreements them­
selves form a sort of constitution, creating the relevant type of relationship 
among all individuals who are subject to their provisions. See discussion infra 
note 61 .  
3 4  Aristotle's substantive principle of distributive justice is akin to our no­
tion of equality or fairness, but like Plato's version, it is not an egalitarian fair­
ness. Aristotle did not conceive of a society of equals, but one of proper shares, 
in which ability, economic status, and character should result in what we would 
consider an unequal distribution of goods; it could be called proportionate 
equality or proportionate fairness. See Ethics, supra note 29, at 402-04, bk. V, 
ch. 3. 
35 See id. at 404-07, bk. V, ch. 4. Corrective justice is often referred to as 
retributive, in that it is associated with criminal punishment, but it is not re­
lated tC? mod�r� nC?tions of retribution and is more properly concerned with 
correctmg an InJUStlce. 
36 Aristotle conceives of corrective justice as applying to what .can be trans­
lated as "transactions," both voluntary and involuntary ones. See FRIEDRICH, 
supra note 9, at 22 (notin� that this distinction roughly mirrors the distinction 
between contract and tort). 
37 The proper share here is not according to the merit-oriented proportions 
of distributive JUStice, but is more akin to the simple sum of the party's gain less 
loss at the start of the interaction, and the change envisioned by the terms of 
the interaction itself. See Ethics, supra note 29, at 404-07, bk. V, ch. 4 .  
Here again, it i s  useful to recall the distinction between the concept of cor­
rective Jusuce and Aristotle's substantive conception of what constituted cor­
rective JUStice and injustice. 
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this injustice is to restore to each party the balance between loss 
and gain that was theirs before the transaction.38 
Aristotle's two-fold characterization of justice has been enor­
mously influential . Students of justice , since Aristotle, treat ques­
tions involving the allocation of social goods, such as wealth, ad­
vantage, and opportunity as issues of distributive justice,39 and 
questions involving the propriety of gain as issues of corrective 
justice .40 It can sometimes be forgotten that Aristotle himself ac­
knowledged that he was working within a larger framework of 
justice as Right Order.4 1  When considered in that context, Aris­
totle's categorizations can be seen as enabling us to more precisely 
apply the general concept of justice as Right Order to the evalua­
tion of the justice of particular distributive or corrective situa­
tions. 
The ensuing history of Western reflection on the p roblem of 
justice involves competing substantive answers to the basic ques­
tion of what constitutes the Right Order, either generally or with 
respect to a particular area of social concern. A comprehensive 
survey of the dominant substantive theories of justice in the West, 
let alone the world, is beyond the scope of this Article, despite its 
undeniable relevance to any definitive account of the nature of 
justice in international economic law.42 However, in order to 
carry out at least the suggestive tasks of the present work, some 
33 See id. This applies even in the case of physical injury, where Aristotle 
acknowledges that it strains the metaphor to speak of the aggressor as gaining 
from the injury to the victim. See id. 
39 See, e.g., KOLM, supra note 15 ,  at 4 ("[TJustice is a central question of all 
life in society .... [I]t is oy nature 'social' and 'distributive."') (emphasis added). 
40 See, e.g. , ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995) 
(elaborating an Aristotelian model of the corrective nature of private law). 
41 See sura text accompanying note 29. This aspect of Aristotle's analysis 
is often misunderstood or criticized. See CAMPBELL, supra note 2 1 ,  at 5 ("[I]t is 
best to follow Aristotle ... where, having distinguished between justice as the 
'complete virtue' and justice as 'a part of virtue', he goes on to concentrate on 
the latter."); H.L .A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 157-58  (1961) (writing en­
tirely of justice in the specific, Aristotelian sense and criticizing more general 
uses of the term). 
42 Such a survey is part of a larger project on the general question of justice 
in international economic law, from which this Article is drawn. The inter­
ested reader is directed to consult any of the several excellent surveys available. 
See generally BRIAN BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE (1973) ; 
CAMPBELL, supra note 21 ;  ]AMES P. STERBA, HOW TO MAKE PEOPLE JUST 
(1988); WHAT IS JUSTICE? (Robert C. Soloman & Mark C. Murphy eels., 1990). 
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general observations concerning Western theories of justice are in 
order. 
To begin with, particular theories of justice, be they liberal or 
Marxist, individualistic or communitarian, contractarian or utili­
tarian, share several traits in common.43 First, each theory must 
explicitly or implicitly account for the possibility of. moral 
knowledge.44 Second, each theory presents a certain account of 
the organization of social relations in terms of whatever moral 
principles are identified as most relevant. Third, and perhaps 
most important for the purposes of this Article, each theory must 
present an account of the sort of rationale one must have for any 
version of the organization of social relations . Restated in terms 
of the acceptability of outcomes, different philosophical theories 
of justice provide particular standards of justification or accept­
ability, by which outcomes can be evaluated and accepted or criti­
cized. 
Since the Enlightenment, if not the Protestant Reformation,45 
the dominant philosophical approach to matters of government 
and society in the West has been liberalism. Liberalism is a noto­
riously difficult term to define. For the purposes of this Article, I 
shall adopt the approach suggested by Jeremy Waldron and focus 
on liberalism as a theory of justice, a "view about the justification 
of social arrangements."46 In Waldron's reconstruction of liberal­
ism, the liberal commitment to freedom and to respect for indi­
vidual human will and capacities generates a requirement that "all 
43 Alasdair Macintyre cautions that it is misleading to compare different 
philosophers' substantive views, or conceptions, of justice, on the grounds that 
these conceptions are heavily dependent on their context, namely an underly­
ing theory of political rationality and a socio-historic tradition. See ALASDA!R 
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 1-11, 389-92 (1988). 
However, I believe the discussion which follows evades this objection, m that 
the common traits identified are the sort of formal qualities of theories of jus­
tice which Macintyre himself investigates and reports. 
44 Underlying the search for a persuasive conception of justice is a debate in 
moral epistemology. Moral philosophers have been preoccupied, throughout 
the last two centuries, with the possibility of moral knowledge. See Bernard 
Cullen, Philosophical Theories of justice, in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 17. In other words, a precondition for a per­
suasive theory of justice is the articulation of rationally convincing grounds for 
our knowledge ot moral categories such as justice. 
45 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxiv (1993). 
46 Waldron, supra note 15, at 128; see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM 
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 1 (1982) ('"[L]iberalism' is above all a theory about 
justice ... . ") . 
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asoects of the social should either be made acceptable or be capa­
bl� of being made acceptable to every last individual ."47 In other 
words, it is a fundamental requirement of liberal theories of jus­
tice that the acceptability of outcomes be demonstrable to any and 
all affected individuals.  
On this view, the differences among liberal theories of justice 
are disagreements over particular principles which claim the abil­
ity to meet this stringent test . Thus, for example, utilitarian, 48 
egalitarian 49 and libertarian 5° theories of justice, while they each 
may differ in the types of justification they suggest for outcomes,5 1 
47 See Waldron, supra note 15, at 128. 
48 The utilitarian account of justice is generally traced to the writings of 
Mill and Bentham, see JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1863) and 
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION (1789), reprinted in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON 
TO MILL (Edwm A. Burtt ed., 1967), and until the publication of John Rawls'A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE, was considered dominant in the field. See RAWLS, supra 
note 20, at 22-27. See generally UTILITY AND RIGHTS (R.G. Frey ed., 1984). 
Initially, utilitarianism conceived of the moral rightness of an act in terms of its 
capacity to produce happiness for the members of society. See MILL, supra, at 
900. "Happiness" has since been generalized into the concept of "welfare" or 
"utility," variously conceived of as hedonic satisfaction, desirable mental states, 
simple preference satisfaction, or rational preference satisfaction. See generally 
KYMLICKA, supra note 20, at 12-18. 
49 Liberal egalitarianism, of which John Rawls' theory is the foremost ex­
ample, considers justice to be a matter of the equitable distribution of basic so­
cial goods such as rights, resources, and ol?portunities according to some con­
cept of "fair shares" that limits an otherwise unlimited utilitarian calculation. 
See, e.g. , RAWLS, supra note 45, at 7-11; Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality?, 10 
PHIL & PUB. AFF. 185-246, 283-345 (1981). See generallyKYMLICKA, supra note 
20, at 50-55. 
50 Libertarians assert the fundamental primacy of individual rights, in par­
ticular rights to property-broadly conceived, and therefore see justice in terms 
of respect for these rights. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND 
UTOPIA (1974). See generally KYMLICKA, supra note 20, at 95-98. 
51 Utilitarianism would justify outcomes in terms of the degree to which 
they maximize utilit[, regardless of whose utility. In terms of the preference­
satisfaction model o utilny, a just outcome is one which satisfies the greatest 
number of informed preferences, even if that means that the preferences of 
some will go unsatisfied, and even if, more disturbingly, the inclusion of 
"illegitimate" preferences, or preferences for outcomes such as racial discrimina­
tion, which we might question on other moral grounds, means a denial to un­
popular groups of what we would want to consider basic rights. See .MlLL, su­
pra note 48, at 947 ("UJustice is [merely] a name for certain moral requirements 
which, [although hi�h on] the scale of social utility, [may be 'overruled' in the 
utilitarian calculus]."). See generally KYMLICKA, supra note 20, at 18-30. 
Egalitarian theories would justify outcomes with reference to the particular 
principle of distribution espoused by the theory. Thus, in a Rawlsian model, 
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are all liberal theories in that they claim to be able to justify out­
comes to any and all affected individuals. 52 What is key in liberal 
theories of justice is the centrality of individual liberty and indi­
vidual rights to the purpose and role of government and to the es­
tablishment of the social order generally. In other words, a pre­
condition to justice is that the social order reflect and promote 
individual liberty and individual rights. 53 The extent to which 
each theory differs suggests the conflicts and contradictions 
within liberalism; which may also surface as liberal theories of 
justice are applied to international economic law. 
an outcome will be just if it is in accord with the dictates of the "difference 
principle," namely that "[a]ll social primary goods . . .  are to be distributed 
equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the ad­
vantao-e of the least favored." RAWLS, supra note 45, at 303. Libertarianism 
would justify outcomes in terms of their degree of respect for fundamental 
property rights, thus objecting to any utilitarian calculus or egalitarian redistri­
butiOn as unjust insofar as these treat rights as contingent or subject to state re­
allocation. For Nozick, social justice in the Rawlsian model is impossible, in 
that any redistributive mechanism contradicts the basic tenet of a free society and a free market, namely the primacy of individual choice and individual 
rights. See NOZICK, supra note 50, at ix, 155-60; KYMLICKA, supra note 20, 96-
107. 
52 Despite the fact that some preferences will go unsatisfied and the prob­
lem of illegitimate preferences, utilitarianism is at least in principle a liberal 
theory in that, formally speaking, each person's preferences count, and count 
equally, in the utility-maximization calculus. See BENTHAM, supra note 48, at 
804 (describing evaluation of merits of legislation in terms of aggregate of indi­
vidual pain ana pleasure); see afsoKYMLICKA, supra note 20, at 25-30. 
Egalitarian theories are clearly liberal in that their basic premise is the 
moral equality of individuals; the justification for any distribution scheme in­
volves individual rights and the individual economic effects of choices and cir­
cumstances and, in Rawls' case, the theory is based on the argument that any 
rational individual in the "Original Position" would choose his principle of jus­
tice. See RAWLS, supra note 45, at 19-21. See generally KYMLICKA, supra note 
20, 58-66. 
. �ibe_rtariar;. t�eories are, of course, liberal, even if they orpos_<liberal" �e­dlstnbutlve po11c1es, because they are based on the pnmacy o md1v1dual choiCe 
and individual rights. For Nozick, rights precede justice. See NOZICK, supra 
note 50, at ix ("Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group 
may do to them."). 
53 In contrast, Marxist theories of justice--that accept the concept of justice 
at all--propose a radically different, communal measure of justice, as do com­
munitarian theories, which are essentially non-Marxist critiques of liberal ac­
counts of justice. See generally KYMLICKA, supra note 20, at 160-237; STEVEN 
LlJr<.ES, MARXISM AND MORALITY (1985) ; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM 
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982) . In these approaches, outcomes are just if 
they can be made acceptable to certain groups, despite the fact that they may 
not be justifiable to certain affected indiv1duals. 
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2. 2. Right Order and Social Allocation in International 
Economic Law 
[Vol 19:2 
The centrality of justice to the analysis and construction of in­
ternational economic law is evident in the nature of the concept 
of justice itself. In the Platonic concept of justice as Right Order, 
whenever we consider the proper order of any aspect of social re­
lations, we are considering a question of justice . In the Aristote­
lian elaboration of this concept, when law and public institutions 
affect the allocation of social benefits or the correction of im­
p.roper �ain, they are raising questions of distributive and correc­tive JUStice. 
Therefore, it is necessarily true that every time the question of 
the proper order of a given aspect of international economic rela­
tions arises, one is considering a question of justice.54 Moreover, 
where law is a primary tool for establishing the social order, ques­
tions of justice in international economic relations will arise as 
questions of international economic law. International economic 
law does indeed affect fundamental decisions about the allocation 
of social benefits among states and among their citizens, including 
benefits such as economic advanta�es, preferences7 and opportuni­ties;55 wealth and pro�erty rights; information;5 and the protec­
tion of the law itself. 8 International economic law also involves 
mechanisms for the identification and correction of improper gain 
through dispute resolution mechanisms, on the interstate59 and 
54 This conclusion depends on the applicability of the concept of justice, 
first developed as Right Order within a pol! tical community, then as Right Or­
der between political communities. See infra note 6 1 .  
55 Such benefits include, for example, tariff rates, tariff preferences, rights 
of establishment, and provision of services. 
56 Among this category of rights are, for example, development assistance, 
trade finance, and intellectual property protection. 
57 Access to information is affected by transnational issues such as trans­
parency requirements and technical assistance. 
58 Whether, for example, economic sanctions are available to increase the 
effectiveness of human rights protections, or whether countries can protect en­
vironmental resources througfi embargo statutes. 
59 For example, dispute settlement mechanisms such as NAFTA's chapter 
20 and the WTO panel process can be understood as institutions for the appli­
cation of corrective justice. See, e.g. ,  Trade Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1997, 
at A22 (criticizing WTO panel 's failure to censure allegedly protectionist prac­
tices in the Japanese film industry as an example of "trade injustice") . 
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private60 levels . Such influence on the part of international eco­
nomic law must therefore be evaluated in terms of theories of dis­
tributive and corrective justice.6 1 
60 The case law of the European Court of Justice and NAFT A's investor 
a�bit_ration prov�sions are examples of the international application of correc­
tive justice to pnvate party conduct . 
1 The fact that one is confronting justice issues in relations among states, 
and among disparate social systems and peoples, rather than within a single 
state or social system, raises tmportant theoretical questions that can only be 
touched on in this Article. First, one might assert that obligations to do justice 
are, by their very nature, not suited to extension beyond the boundaries 
(presumed territorial) of a given political community. See, e.s., RAWLS, supra 
note 45, at 12, 272 n.9; RAWLS, supra note 21, at 7-8, 457 (notmg that a theory 
of justice presupposes a closed soc1ety that seeks justice within a closed system, 
not including justice between nations) . However, this view may be an artifact 
of social contractarian arguments for political morality, rather than a general 
limitation inherent to moral obligations by their very nature. See Anthony 
D'Amato & Kristen Engel, State Responsibility for the Exportation of Nuclear 
Power Technology, 7 4 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1043-46 (1988) (discussing tensions be­
tween universal and socially contingent aspects of social contractarian ap­
proaches to political philosophy). It has, in fact, been vigorously asserted that 
territorial boundaries are irrelevant to moral obligations. See Fernando R. 
Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM . L. REV.  53 , 82-83 
(1992) ("The contingent divtsion of the world into discrete nation-states does 
not transform polittcal freedom from an ethical imperative into a mere his­
tory.") ; D 'Amato & Engel, supra, at 1042 ("[A] national boundary is an artifi­
cial, as well as a morally irrelevant, boundary with respect to moral obliga­
tions.") .  Moreover, Rawls has been criticized for failing to extend the original 
position to its logical transnational application. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, 
THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN 253 -62 (1993) . Finally, to the extent that ob­
ligations of justice depend upon some form of shared political community, it 
may be that international economic relations, particularly economic integration 
systems, establish the requisite form or level of transnational community. See 
D'Amato & Engel, supra at 1046-47 ("The requirements of justice apply to in­
stitutions and practices . . .  in which social activity produces relative or absolute 
benefits or burdens that would not exist if the social activity did not take 
place. ") (quoting CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY A ND INTER­
NATIONAL RELATIONS 131 (1979)) ; supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. 
It can also be argued that, in the international community, as it exists to-
\ day, obligations ofd·ustice are tempered or superseded by some form of realpoli­
tik, see Terry Nar in, Realism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Rule of Law, 81 AM . 
Soc'Y INT'L L. 415-16 (1987) (ar_guing that realism dictates that foreign policy 
be guided by prudent strategies for national survival, not morality) , or that ef­
forts at promoting justice wtll inevitably be perceived as "cultural imperialism, 
paternaltsm or worse." Alfred P. Rubin,A Skeptical View, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 
403,  405 (1980) (reviewing CHARLES R. BEITZ'S  POLITICAL THEORY AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979)) . However, this sort of pragmatic or utili­
tarian reasoning can itself be criticized on moral grounds as treating absolute 
moral obligations as discretionary. 
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The importance of recognizing this link between trade and 
justice increases with the globalization of the world economy and 
the development of international economic law. The greater the 
scope and importance of international economic law as a feature 
of international economic relationships, and the deeper its impact 
throughout the societies of trading states beyond traditional eco­
nomic issues such as tariff rates and investment rules, the more we 
must be concerned with its normative impact and implications. 
In other words, the broader the law's ordering power, and the 
more its "order" impinges on our attempts and our ability to 
"order" other aspects of our society, the more we must be con­
cerned with the "Rightness" or the "justice" of the resulting inter­
national economic order. 
In addition to the conceptual links discussed thus far between 
justice, international economic relations, and international eco­
nomic law, there are very particular reasons why our jurispru­
dence requires us to consider, or at the very least does not excuse 
us from considering, what claims a concept of justice might make 
on the construction of international economic law.  This assertion 
shall be explored in connection with the three principle accounts 
of the relationship between justice and law, which also apply to 
the question of the relationship between justice and international 
economic law: the traditional naturalist view, the modern natu­
ralist view, and the positivist view. 62 
There are many forms of naturalism, from the classical natu­
ralism of Greece and Rome 63 through the systematic, magisterial 
naturalism of Aquinas64 and up to the various modern naturalisms 
of Fuller,65 Finnis,66 and even Dworkin.67 In its strongest form, 
62 There are, of course, other accounts of law and its relationship with mo­
rality, including legal real ism, critical legal studies, and historical junsprudence. 
The three accounts discussed in this Article were chosen because of their his­
toric importance. 
63 See generally J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL 
THEORY 19-21 ,  57-63 (1992) .  
64 See St . Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, questions 90-95, reprinted in 
INTRODUCTION TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 609-50 (Anton C. Pegis ed. , 1948) 
[hereinafter AQUINAS]. 
65 See LON L . FULLER, THEMORALITY OF LAW (1964) . 
66 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1988) . 
67 In his Dunwoody lecture, Dworkin reluctantly accepts the label of 
"naturalist" insofar as that means his theory "makes the content of law some­
times depend on the correct answer to some moral question." Ronald A.  
Dworkin, Natural Law Revisited, in 2 NATURAL LAW 1 87 Gohn Finnis ed. ,  
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of which Aquinas is the foremost medieval exponent68 and Finnis 
the leading modern representative, 69 naturalism asserts two linked 
pro�ositions : that knowledge of objective moral truth is possi­
ble, 0 and that humanly promulgated law must conform to the 
dictates or norms of this moral truth in order to be considered 
fully valid law.71 While Aquinas and Finnis acknowledge the exis­
tence of morally questionable laws,72 both Aquinas and Finnis 
would regard such "law" as fatally defective although Aquinas, 
and to a greater extent Finnis, might nevertheless acknowledge 
h . 
1 . 73 t etr status as aw tn some sense. 
In contrast, both Fuller and Dworkin conceive of the moral­
ity which they see as relevant to law as something less than the 
objective morality of traditional naturalism. Fuller's morality is a 
limited one, confined to what he terms the morality of law it­
self/4 and thus his naturalism could be called a "limited" natural­
ism. Dworkin, while seeking to express a link to broader moral 
principles, sees that morality as the morality of the relevant 
1991) . However, in important respects his stance IS beyond the natural­
ist/ positivist distinction. See id. 
68 See AQUINAS, supra note 64. 
69 On Finnis' role as a leading modern exponent of traditional naturalism, 
see Neil MacCormick, Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals, in 
NATURAL LAW THEORY 105 (Robert P. George ed., 1992) (crediting Finnis 
with the powerful contemporary restatement of the classical traditwn) . Re­
garding Finnis' own views, see FINNIS, supra note 66. 
70 See AQUINAS, supra note 64, at question 91 ,  art . 2 (noting that natural 
law is rational human nature's participatiOn, through reason, in eternal truths) ; 
see also FINNIS, supra note 66, at 59-99 (arguing that the seven basic values of ex­
istence can be identified as self-evident through rational introspection) . 
71 See AQUINAS, supra note 64, at question 91 ,  art. 3 (noting that human 
laws proceed from practical reasoning upon the precepts of natural law) ; id. at 
questwn 95, art. 2 ("[E]very human law has just so much of the nature of law as 
it is derived from the law of nature. ") ;  see also Hans Kelsen, Foundation of the 
Natural Law Doctrine, 1973 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 2, 83-1 1 1  reprinted in 1 
NATIJRAL LAW 125 (John Finnis ed. , 199 1) . 
72 See AQUINAS, supra note 64, at question 93, art. 3 (recognizing existence 
of unjust or wicked laws) ; see also FINNIS, supra note 66. 
73 See AQUINAS, supra note 64, at question 93, art. 3 (noting that even an 
unjust law retains some apJ?earance of law through its promulgation by one in 
authority, though its principal character is of violence, not law) ;FINNlS, supra 
note 66, at 363-66 (arguing that to say unjust laws are not laws distorts a com­
plex relationship, as unjust law may still be law in a technical sense but not 
worthy of obedience as law). 
74 See FULLER, supra note 65, at 38-44 (reviewing the basic elements of law's 
morality) . 
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community, not a particular moral order based in God's will or 
an objective natural order.75 This results in a sort of "open" natu­
ralism, where what is necessary is a link to moral principles, and 
not the possibility of an objectively identifiable universal moral . 76 VieW. 
With respect to either form of naturalism, the demands of jus­
tice will be expressed as fundamental claims upon international 
economic law and its actors, insofar as internatio nal economic law 
claims to be law, and its actors attempt to operate within that law. 
The heart of the naturalist view of international economic law 
can be expressed syllogistically as follows : 
(1) international economic law consists of the regulation of in­
ternational economic activity through law; 
(2) all law, insofar as it claims the status of law, must be just; 
(3) therefore, international economic law, insofar as it claims 
to be law, must be just . 
The differences among the various naturalisms lies in their dif­
ferent versions of the minor premise, according to their definition 
of justice as it is relevant to law, and their account of the relation-h . . 77 s lp . 
The distinctiveness of the modern positivist view lies in its 
substitution of an essentially formal description of the defining 
characteristic of law for what had heretofore been an essentially 
75 S D 1 . ee wor nn, supra note 67. 
76 "In principle, natural law theory may adopt any ethics." Deryck Bey­
leveld & Roger Brownsword, The Practical Difference Between Natural-Law The­
ory and Legal Positivism, in 2 NATURAL LAW, supra note 67, at 138 .  
7 7  The traditional naturalist view would go beyond the bare assertion of 
the minor premise and assert a particular substantive standard of justice for in­
ternational economic law, derived from a philosophical or theological account 
of objective morality. Modern naturalism would assert, in the limited natural­
ist version, that international economic law, as is required of all law, must con­
form to the basic morality of law in order to have such status. However, these 
claims are more limited than the moral claims which traditional naturalism 
might impose on international economic law. The open naturalist view would 
assert that international economic law, at least in the context of dispute resolu­
tion, must have recourse to some theory of justice, but would not specify or de­
fend any particular theory, asserting rather the link itself. Thus, one could say 
that the McDougal/Lasswell approach to international law is a form of natural­
ism in that it does not attempt to argue for the key values of a universal order 
of human dignity as part of its theory of law, but does maintain that a link be­
tween law and these values, however established; accordingly it plays an essen­
tial role in the appraisal and critique of public order systems. See MYRES S. 
MCDOUGAL & ASSOC . ,  STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 16 ,  21-22 (1960). 
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normative one.78 In The Concept of Law, for example,  H.L.A. 
Hart provides a sophisticated account of law as a system of pri­
mary and secondary rules.79 The conflict between this view of 
law and naturalism lies not in any positivist account of the formal 
qualities of legal systems, but in the separability thesis: the asser­
tion that such a view is a sufficient account of the nature and 
function of law, separate from any reference to the law's moral-. 80 tty.  
Using Hart's  theory as an example, the positivist view of in­
ternational economic law can also be expressed syllogistically, il­
lustrating the contrast to natural law as well: 
(1) international economic law consists of the regulation of in­
ternational economic activity through law; 
(2) all law, insofar as it claims the status of law, must consist of 
a system of primary and secondary rules; 
(3) therefore, international economic law, insofar as it claims 
to be law, must consist of a system of primary and secondary 
rules. 
Any mention of justice is absent from the minor premise, and 
therefore necessarily absent from the conclusion. 
What is particularly noteworthy for our purposes is that, in 
spite of his insistence on the formal independence of law and mo­
rality as a definitional and constitutive matter, Hart took great 
pains to point out that law in fact could not and should not be 
evaluated independently from morality. To begin with, Hart ac­
knowledges a fundamental similarity between a narrowly defined 
version of justice as fairness and certain essential properties of law 
78 Law, in this view, is to be seen as "merely" or "essentially" certain types 
of statements, declarations, or rules that qualify as law because of their formal 
characteristics and not by reference to moral principles . Hart, for example, 
characterizes law's "essence" as the union of pnmary and secondary rules, and 
contrasts this to traditional naturalist accounts of this essence as consisting of 
the necessary link between law and morality. See HART, supra note 41,  at 151 -
55. 
79 The "primary" rules of law governing behavior recognizable in primitive 
and modern legal systems are themselves established, administered, and changed 
through the application of "secondary" rules which characterize mature legal 
systems, chief among these being the rule of recognition. See id. 
80 See id. at 185-87; see, e.g. , David Lyons, Moral Aspects of Lez..al Theory, in 
RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE 49 (Marshall Co­
hen ed. ,  1984) .  
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as a rule system.8 1  Moreover, of all the claims of morality, the 
claims of justice are privileged in their criticism of law, because 
justice, in the sense of treating like cases alike, is very much like 
the notion of proceeding by a rule . 82 However, in  neither case 
does Hart admit the claim that legal systems and laws, in order to 
be so considered, must comply with the broader claims of natural 
law, or with the claims of justice more broadly defined, which are 
very distinct from the nature of law.83 Law's morality, broadly 
speaking, is not rooted in law itself, but in the moral obligations 
we are subject to in private and public life on the basis of inde­
pendent philosophical or theological commitments. Nevertheless, 
Hart does contemplate and indeed advocate the moral critique of 
substantive law. In fact, he considers the positivist definition of 
law to facilitate an accurate moral critique of law.84 
From a positivist standpoint, therefore, the demands of justice 
on international economic law will take the form of policies to be 
pursued through such law, either as a matter of independent 
moral obligation or simple prudence. The positivist argument 
presupposes no necessary link between international economic 
law and justice, or any other value, at a definitional level, beyond 
a shared concern for the application of rules. To the extent inter­
national economic law is created or evaluated with reference to 
the substantive claims of justice, this may reflect simply the deci­
sion of the law-makers or analysts that it is prudent or useful for 
international economic law to be just. Alternatively, a positivist 
might conclude that international economic law must be just, but 
8 1 In Hart's account of the relationship of justice to law, he admits a close 
link between the administration of law and Aristotelian notions of equality in 
distribution and correction. See HART, supra note 41 ,  at 1 60-62. 
82 See id. at 1 6 1 .  
83 Hart thus explicitly relies on a narrow Aristotelian concelt o f  specific 
justice, distinguishing it from broader moral claims. This is vita for h1m be­
cause, as we have seen, he admits a special link between this sort of justice and 
law. See discussion supra Section 2 . 1 .  If he accepted the broader view of justice, 
it would both resemb1e less the administrative requirements of rule systems and 
in fact admit the entire naturalist argument. 
84 Hart contends that the naturalist assertion, that unjust laws are not laws, 
is muddled and merely confuses the issues at stake. He suggests, instead, that 
the conflict is precisely over obedience to a valid law that may nevertheless be 
"'too iniquitous to obey or apply. '" See HART , supra note 4 1 ,  at 205. 
As Hart explains, a positivist analysis of law squarely/resents us with the 
choice among greater and lesser evils and injustices involve when, for example, 
later courts are called upon to judge liability or guilt under Nazi statutes. See id. 
at 208- 12 .  
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for reasons of obligations rooted in political o r  moral philosophy, 
rather than its nature as law. 85 However, in neither case is there 
any sense in which positivism is an obstacle to or substitute for 
the normative evaluation of international economic law, nor does 
it diminish the importance of theories of justice to such an evalua­
tion on independent moral or prudential grounds. 86 
2.3. Inte--rnational Economic Law and the Claims of justice 
One's view of the nature and force of the actual claims of jus­
tice on international economic law will differ according to one's 
position on the relation of law to moralilJ generally, and accord­
ing to one's substantive theory of justice. It is beyond the scope 
of this Article to address all substantive theories of justice and the 
richness of their possible claims on international economic law, 
nor will this Article fully develop one substantive position on jus­
tice and apply to it to the richness of issues in international eco­
nomic law. Rather, what this Article will attempt in what fol­
lows is to suggest, in an illustrative manner, how theories of 
justice could entail particular claims on international economic 
law. In the section which follows, this type of general relation­
ship will be explored in connection with the trade linkage issue. 
First, and most importantly from a Western standpoint ,  the 
claims of justice will affect the threshold question of the rule of 
law in international economic relations, and on this there is wide 
agreement. Fundamental to any conception of Western justice is 
a commitment to the rule of law. 88 Such a commitment is also 
recognized by traditional trade theorists as a cornerstone of our 
attempts to regulate international economic relations through in-
85 Of course, a positivist's particular view of the requirements of justice in 
international economic law will depend on the substantlVe theory of JUStice to 
which that positivist is committed. 
86 In fact, one can extrapolate from Hart's writings that positivism facili­
tates the normative evaluation of international economic law, and might, in 
some limited way, even require it. 
87 There is, however, no view of international economic law that does not 
presuppose or entail some answer to the question of what constitutes the Right 
Order, with the possible exception of a chaotic one. Even an anarchic view of 
international law embodies one view of the Right Order. 
88 See Aristotle, Politics, in ARlSTOTLE, supra note 29, at 598 ("[L]aws, 
when good, should be supreme.") ;  CAMPBELL, supra note 21, at 23-27 (noting 
that the rule of law ideal 1s linked both to substantive justice-consistent apph­
cation of just rules-and formal justice-consistency of rule application as an 
independent principle of justice) . 
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ternational economic law.89 This commitment to the rule of law 
as a principle of western justice necessarily implies that interna­
tional economic law systems, in particular their institutional 
mechanisms, are subject to evaluation and critique according to 
how effectively they uphold, advance, or undercut the rule of law 
in international economic relations. 90 
Western theories of justice can also serve to justify, from a 
normative standpoint, the fundamental economic concept of lib­
eralization of trade. The core trade and integration commitment 
to liberalize trade naturally reflects the principles of trade eco­
nomics, in which liberalized trade contributes to increased wel­
fare due to gains in efficiency and the unfettered operation of 
comparative advantage. In doing so, however, liberalized trade 
also contributes directly to the achievement of the core aim of 
liberal justice, in that such welfare increases are a necessary pre­
condition to a more just distribution of wealth and an improved 
standard of living for the least advantaged.9 1 Trade liberalization 
also directly reflects the fundamental commitment to individual 
liberty common to all Western theories of justice, in that it di-
89 JOHN H .  JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 85-88 (1989) 
(arguing that a rule-oriented approach should predominate in international eco­
nomic relations) . But see Phillip R. Trimble, International Trade and the "Rule 
ofLaw," 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1030 (1984-85) (suggesting that GATT's major 
advantage lay in its ambiguous, flexible, and non-legal approach) . 
In fact , the modern international economic law movement has been at the 
forefront of the expansion of the rule of law in international relations generally. 
See Tohn H. Jackson, International Economic Law: Reflections on the 
"Boiferroom " of International Relations, 10  AM. U.; . lNT'L L. & PoL'Y 595, 596 
("[I]t is plausible to suggest that ninety percent o international law work is in 
reality international economic law in some form or anmher.") ; Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, 17 Nw. J. INT'L 
L. & Bus. 398,  399 (1996-97) ("[International economic law] has become one of 
the most important foreign policy instruments for promoting not only eco­
nomic welfare but also individual freedom and rule of law.") . 
90 See generally Petersmann, supra note 89, at 428-29, 43 1 ,  45 1  (evaluating 
rule of law aspects of select international economic law institutions) . 
9 1  See Petersmann, supra note 89, at 400 (noting that "market institutions" 
regulated by economic law "are an indispensable complement of human rights 
for [the promotion of] human well-being") . See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 8, 203-22 (1997) (noting that markets play 
an important, albeit limited role in a basic rights system, for example in the de­
velopment of constitutional democracies in Eastern Europe) . This assumes, of 
course, that the distributive justice issues are also addressed .See infra notes 1 05,  
109, 128 ,  146 .  
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reedy expands the scope for unfettered individual decision­
making in economic activity.92 
Justice also plays a central role in the evaluation of interna­
tional economic law institutions. Institutions created through in­
ternational economic agreements, such as the World Trade Or­
ganization ("WTO") and the NAFT A Commission, can be 
analyzed from a variety of perspectives independent of moral and 
political philosophy. However, a justice perspective can clarify 
the implications of the design and operation of such institutions 
for the realization of our fundamental values, affecting for exam­
ple how trade institutions reach decisions and resolve disputes. 93 
3 .  JUSTICE AND THE "TRADE AND" PHENOMENON 
So far, the assertion that the claims of justice are essential to 
the analysis of international economic law is not likely to excite 
much controversy, even among those who maintain what one 
scholar has termed the "Efficiency Model" of trade law in which 
trade is strictly a matter of economic efficiency and welfare.94 
That is, in part, because the issues discussed thus far, such as the 
rule of law, elimination of trade barriers, and the construction 
and operation of trade institutions, can be seen from the vantage 
point of traditional economic theory as simply part of what trade 
. " b "95 1s a out. 
92 See Peters mann, supra note 89, at 400 (noting that properly functioning 
market institutions (i .e . ,  markets regulated by economic law) are an indispensa­
ble complement of human rights for promotmg individual autonomy) .  On  this 
view government intervention in trade through tariffs and non-tantf barriers, 
for example, is inadvisable insofar as it reduces mdividual economic liberty. 
93 For example, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann's work applying constitutional­
ism theory to the WTO and other international economic law institutions 
eoints out several aspects of trade liberalization systems which advance or re­
flect fundamental liberal commitments to justice in social and economic rela­
tions, including: separation of powers, protection of fundamental rights, neces­
sity and proportionality rules, and democratic participation. See id. at 429-32 .  
9 4  See Jeffrey L .  Dunoff, Rethinking International Trade, in Symposium, 
Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L 
ECON. L. 201 (1998) ; infra notes 130-3 1 and accompanying text. 
95 Of course, there may be some controversy about the precise outcomes 
that different normative theories may dictate. For example, to the extent con­
stitutionalism theory suggests that bmding dispute resolution is to be preferred 
on normative grounds over simr:le advisory opinions, this claim might be re­
sisted by those who see the decis10n as a purely functional or political one. See 
supra notes 89-90. 
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However, the implications of justice for international eco­
nomic law become more controversial when one moves beyond 
these sorts of issues to a consideration of other trade policy issues 
raised by the current "trade and" debate. This debate forces us to 
consider questions involving gross economic inequalities , conflict­
ing concepts of human dignity and environmental protection, 
other heavily value-laden issues such as "culture" and :'property," 
and the role of such questions in trade law at all . In discussing 
linkages such as "trade and development,"  "trade and labor," 
"trade and the environment,"  and "trade and human rights,"  we 
are delving more deeply and perhaps more problematically into 
the nature of the relationship between trade and justice. 
3.1. Recognizing the Linkage Between Justice and the "Trade 
and , Debate 
Each "trade and __ " debate has, at its root, a question or se­
ries of questions which are about justice. Perhaps the most fun­
damental question is this: Who shall we trade with, and on what 
terms? More particularly, we may ask the following: What are 
the moral implications for us if our trading p artners are, as a 
whole, much poorer than ourselves?96 What if our trading part­
ner's society is h.iphly stratified, such that the gains from trade 
only go to a few?9 What if a trading partner has a different or no 
concwtion of environmental harm and environmental protec­
tion? What if our trading partners have a radically different (or 
lack any) concept of human dignity?99 Can we use the trading 
system to redistribute global wealth across states, encourage more 
equitable distributions of wealth within states, change or enforce 
human dignity laws, or protect the environment in such cases, 
even at some cost to liberal trading principles? Should we? 
It is the main contention of this Article that these questions, 
and the similar questions underlying each of the maj or "trade 
and" debates, are inescapably moral questions, i . e . ,  they are ques­
tions of justice. They are justice questions because they are ques­
tions of order, and they are inquiries into the Right Order for the 
96 See infra notes 1 00-08 and accompanying text. 
97 See infra notes 109-14 ;1nd accompanying text. 
98 See infra notes 1 15-24 and accompanying text. 
99 See infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text. 
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g1ven set of social relationships they presuppose or establish . 100 
They are questions of justice because their resolution depends 
upon our making decisions as to the allocation of social goods and 
social burdens , and may involve an investigation into the propri­
ety of certain gains and the correction of improper gain. 101 
The link between trade and the inequalities of various kinds 
that exist between trading states is a fitting place to begin explor­
ing this contention, as the link is an ancient and perhaps constitu­
tive one. On the one hand, the theory of comparative advantage 
suggests that certain inequalities are the sine qua non of trade, in 
that it is the disparity in resource distribution which offers trad­
ing states the key opportunity to specialize. 102 However, the 
more troublesome aspect of the link between trade and inequali­
ties in levels of development among states has also been recog­
nized since the early days of the study of trade itself, consisting of 
the manifold opportunities for outright predation and con­
quest, 103 as well as for the pursuit of other inherently self-serving 
policies such as mercantilism, 104 presented to developed states in 
their trade relations with the less-developed world. 
100 That they involve relationships across societies and national boundaries, 
it is argued, need not alter the basis of moral obligation. See supra note 61. 
101  For example, Dunoff writes that trade and issues such as intellectual 
property highlight the fact that interstate, distributional questions are at the 
center of international trade policy, challengin& one view common in the litera­
ture that cooperation or collaboration, rather tnan distribution, is the key issue. 
See Dunoff, supra note 94. 
102 See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 668 (1973) (noting that the 
starting point for comparative advantage is diversity in conditions of produc­
tion between different countries) . 
103 In his seminal work, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF 
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, Adam Smith writes: 
Folly and injustice seem to have been the principles which presided 
over and directed the first project of establishing [the American] colo­
nies; the folly of hunting after gold and silver mines, and the injustice 
of coveting the possession of a country whose harmless natives, far 
from having ever injured the people ofEurope, had received the first 
adventurers with every mark of kindness and hospitality . . . .  [I]t was 
not the wisdom and policy, but the disorder and injustice ofthe Euro­
pean governments which peopled and cultivated America. 
ADAJ\1 SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS 350-51 (Kathryn Sutherland ed. , 1993) .  
104 See id. at 351-52. 
When [the North and South American colonies] were effectuated, and 
had become so considerable as to attract the attention of the mother 
country, the first regulations which she made with regard to them had 
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The problem of trade and inequality is a paradigmatic case of 
the link between trade and justice . The distribution of social 
goods between the richer and the poorer is a central concern of 
theories of justice. 105 Public debate concerning the relations be­
tween richer and poorer states as a matter of justice peaked within 
international economic law with the birth and demise of the 
movement for a New International Economic Order 
("NIE0") . 106 While the NIEO may have failed as a political mat­
ter, this does not mean that the arguments asserted by NIEO ad­
vocates have been refuted. 
One can discern in the debate over trade and development a 
range of positions traceable to the principal Western substantive 
theories of justice . Perhaps the most familiar reply to the ques­
tion "What is our duty to developing states in structuring our 
trade relationships?" might consist of utilitarian justifications for 
various types of assistance to underdeveloped states, such as an 
appeal to increased stability in international relations or to the 
creation of larger and stronger markets of consumers for our 
products. 107 An egalitarian liberal approach, however, might re­
ject such utilitarian reasoning despite an apparent agreement in 
outcomes, and argue instead for the existence of a moral duty to 
aid poorer states based on deontological moral principles. Rawls' 
difference principle, for example, could be extended to cover eco-
!d. 
always in view to secure to herself the monopoly of their commerce; 
to confine their market, and to enlarge her own at their expense, and, 
consequently, rather to damp and discourage, than to quicken and 
forward the course of their prosperity. 
105 This is certainly true as applied to domestic society, and, it is argued, 
would hold equally true where the richer and the poorer are states and not just 
individuals. See supra note 6 1 .  
106 The New International Economic Order, or NIEO,  was a movement 
among developing countries within the United Nations ("UN") to force a shift 
in international economic relations away from structurally disadvantageous 
policies towards a more equitable relationship between developed and develop­
mg countries. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Eco­
nomic Order, G.A. Res. 320 1 ,  U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess . ,  Supp. No. 1 ,  at 3, U.N. 
Doc. A/9559 (1974) , reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 .  Despite the adoption of the 
founding resolution and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 
G.A. Res. 328 1 ,  U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 1 ,  at 50, U.N. Doc. A/963 1 (1975) , 
the movement has been widely acknowledged as a failure. See generally Bartram 
S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade Order, 14 N. ILL U. 
L. REV. 347 (1994); Robert E .  Hudec, GA TT and the Developing Countries, 1992 
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 67. 
107 See SMITH, supra note 103, at 308-09. 
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nomic relations with less advantaged states,  leading t o  a duty to 
effect wealth redistributions across national boundaries beyond 
those that are justifiable on utilitarian lines. 108 A libertarian view, 
in contrast, would question such principles and resist any such 
trans-boundary redistribution in favor of some minimal notion of 
procedural fairne��9 
or fairness of opportunity on the part of less 
advantaged states. 
Whatever one's view as to the appropriate answer to these 
questions, simply understanding the trade-development link as a 
justice issue involving the problem of inequality implies that we 
are not free to govern our economic relationships with poorer na­
tions solely with regard to the politics of the moment. Moreover, 
viewing the trade and development linkage as a justice matter 
raises the question of how one can consistently be a redistributive 
egalitarian at home and a libertarian or political realist abroad. 1 10 
Given the nature of our concept of justice, it becomes incumbent 
on those seeking to establish an economic order that does not 
consider the claims of less developed states to articulate a norma­
tive basis for this position. In other words, they must explain 
why such an order would be Right. 
A related, and far more controversial, inequality problem in­
volves the inequalities within the societies of trading states and 
whether, as a matter of distributive justice, trading states are obli­
gated to take into account such inequalities in their trade and eco-
108 See D'Amato & Engel, supra note 61 ,  at 1047; STONE, supra note 6 1 ,  at 
255-60. 
109 The classic libertarian-egalitarian conflict involves a fundamental disa­
greement over the moral legitimacy of state-effected wealth redistribution. In 
this context, the debate would be over the legitimacy of such redistributions 
effected through trade agreements between states. However, even if one con­
cedes to the hbertarian the assertion that the free market may be the best 
mechanism for basic distribution questions, the criticism can be made that the 
moral basis for this position is suostantially undermined by the reality of ine­
quality, particularly gross inequality, in natural "endowments." What is there 
to guarantee that the open market exchanges do not further erode or deny the 
bas1c rights of the weaker party? The liberal objection, that there can be no 
freedom where two sides are grossly unequal, emerged in the early nineteenth 
century in the work of T.H. Green and others. See KELLY, supra note 63, at 
306. Therefore, the state has a role in setting the basic conditions for a mean­
ingful exchange, a moral exchange. !d. 
1 10 I am not so much questioning the validity of a libertarian view, but the 
consistency of simultaneously holding both commitments. 
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nomic integration systems. 1 1 1  At a normative level , the assertion 
that distributive inequalities within a society are justice matters 
can scarcely be gainsaid. But do states have a duty to consider 
inequality problems within their trading partners?  Moreover, at 
an empirical level, one can distinguish between the distributive 
inequalities which might exist in a state relatively independent of 
trade and its effects, and the well-recognized fact that the effects of 
trade itself can vary widely with regard to groups within trading 
states; some groups may suffer great harm while the state as a 
whole prospers. 1 1  Even if one were unwilling to recognize a 
duty to consider domestic inequalities generally, might not this 
empirical distinction between "types" or "sources" of inequality 
suggest a duty to consider trade-related inequalities? 
From a utilitarian viewpoint, one might consider such con­
cern useful or desirable but decide that the significant practical 
difficulties in responding to these trans-boundary concerns, and 
the potential friction from claims of meddling in internal affairs, 
would render the cost of such policies too high in relation to the 
benefit potentially to be achieved. A liberal Kantian analysis of 
international law, however, would suggest that recognition of 
such concerns and the e�su�n� respo�sibil}}y are unavoidab.le a.s a matter of respect for md1v1dual nghts. · A commumtanan 
analysis would agree with the need to consider the effects of trade 
on the disadvantaged in a trading partner's society, but would 
suggest that the relevant unit of analysis is the group rather than 
1 1 1  Traditionally, the economic disadvantages of individuals within their 
own states were not considered a legitimate subject for international law, which 
favored the black box or billiard ball approach to state relations. Recently, 
however, this view of international law has undergone significant criticism and 
modification from the human rights movement and particularly from feminist 
theorists of international law, who have attacked the public/pnvate distinction 
as inimical to the rights of women within state societies. See Hilary Charles­
worth et al. ,  Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 6 13 ,  
625-30 (1991). 
1 12 See JACKSON, supra note 89, at 1 6; see also Philip Alston, International 
Trade as an Instrument of Positive Human R ights Policy . 4 HUM. RTS. Q. 155,  
177 (1982) (noting that the ILO advocates trade liberalization that addresses 
possible adverse labor and distribution effects) ; Enrique R.  Carrasco, Law, Hi­
erarchy, and Vulnerable Groups in Latin America: Towards a Communal Model of 
Development in a Neoliberal World, 30 STAN. J .  INT'L L. 221 ,  275 (1994) (noting 
that economic neoliberalism has not addressed, and may have worsened, the 
condition of vulnerable groups) . 
1 13 See Tes6n, supra note 61 ,  at 8 1-84 (arguing that human rights protec­
tions are fundamental to international law and the legitimacy of states) . 
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the individual, and that trading states have an affirmative duty to 
act to improve the plight of vulnerable groups. 1 14  In contrast, a 
libertarian might limit a state's  duty, both at home and abroad, to 
attempts to encourage policies in our trading partners that favor 
individual rights and the protection of private property. 1 15 In any 
event, the simple assertion that ,  whatever one's duty is to one's  
less fortunate fellows, that duty does not apply across national 
boundaries, is not likely to go unchallenged in contemporary de­
bates over the justice of failing to consider the stratification of 
' d. 1 1 6 one s tra mg partners. 
The trade and environment linkagei by contrast, has been at the forefront of the linkage movement . 17 Environmentalists are 
1 1 4  See Carrasco, supra note 1 12, at 305 (arguing that economic regulation 
must ?ive priority to conditions affecting vulnerable groups) . 
1 1  Alternatively, a libertarian might maintain that states have no role at all 
with respect to the domestic policies of other states, stemming from a view of 
states as "libertarian individuals" facing regulatory intervention both horizon­
tally from one another and vertically from International regimes. 
1 16 From the perspective of one's moral obligation, why should our con­
cern for those with an inequitable share of resources be affected by the inter­
vening modality of a state? Sovereignty is the traditional answer, but it may 
not be an adequate one. Perhaps it 1s legitimate to assert that sovereignty pre­
vents us from forcing our notion of eqmtable distributions on another trading 
partner. But might it not be the case that sovereignty is more likely to be raised 
by us , ourselves, to avoid the assertion that we have a duty, rather than bv the 
intended beneficiaries of our concern? With resl?ect to the collapse ot the 
Mexican economy and the devaluation of the peso m 1994, Jorge Castaneda as­
serts the complicny of the United States in its decision to ignore the undemo­
cratic politics and unequal wealth distribution accompanymg Mexico's trade 
liberalization reforms. "[N]o one, it seems, was willing to analyze the over­
whelming evidence of abuses and financial mismanagement in Mexico since 
1988 . . . .  Those surprised by the economic collapse and the stench of it all had 
simply neglected to open their eyes . "  JORGE G. CASTANEDA, THE MEXICAN 
SHOCK: ITS MEANING FOR THE UNITED STATES 4-5 (1995) .  
1 1 7 The trade and environment linkage has been actively in the public eye 
since the early 1990s. Thomas J. Schoenbaum notes that, while the GATT es­
tablished a Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade in 1971 ,  
i t  did not meet until 199 1 .  See Thomas J .  Schoenbaum , International Trade and 
Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 9 1  AM. 
J. INT'L L. 268 , 268 (1997) . The early 1990's also saw the publication of path­
oreaking works such as Daniel Esty's Greening the GA TT: Trade, Environment 
and the Future; see generally EsTY, supra note 2, and a series of GATT panel re­
Ports destined to have a significant impact on the trade and environment de­
bate. See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Im­
ports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS20/R (1994) , reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839; GATT 
Dispute Settlement Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 
Aug. 16 ,  1991 GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) , reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 
1 594 (the Tuna/Dolphin decisions) . 
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attracted to the possibility of putting the tremendous leverage af­
forded by the threat of trade sanctions in the service of ensuring 
compliance with environmental protection obligations, 1 18 and 
have concerns about the trade regulatorl system adversely affect­
ing their regulatory goals and systems. 1 1  In much the same way, 
the trade community fears the environmentalists'  interference 
" 1 1  d . h d" 120 w1 un ermme t e tra mg system. 
It is not necessarily clear, at first blush, how the trade and en­
vironment linkage reflects a debate over justice. Even if one were 
to concede an ethical obligation to protect the natural world, 1 2 1 
how does this come within that category of obligations we recog­
nize as justice, for example, in the traditional Aristotelian sense of 
an allocation of social goods, since it involves obligations to non-
h . . "1 1 22 uman ent1t1es:-
1 18 This is evidenced by several recent treaties such as the Basel Convention 
and the Montreal Protocol. See, e.g. , Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 
1989, S .  TREATY Doc. No. 5 (1991) ,  28 I.L.M. 657; Montreal Protocol on 
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept . 1 6, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) . 
1 19 Environmentalists' concerns include the fear that trade liberalization 
principles such as national treatment will be used to override conflicting provi­
sions 1ll statutory and treaty-based environmental protection measures, as m the 
Tuna/Dolphin example, and that the principle of comparative advantage will 
be used to legitimize a "race to the bottom" in terms of lax environmental pro­
tection laws. See Daniel C. Esty, Unpacking the "Trade and Environment" Con­
flict, 25 LAW & POL'Y lNT'L Bus. 1259, 1260-61 (1994) . 
120 This includes the threat that legitimate protective devices which consti­
tute exceptions to trade disciplines can easily oe deployed for illegitimate pro­
tectionist purposes . See JACKSON, supra note 89, at 201 ;  Roessler, supra note 2, 
at 227. Additionally, there is a concern that permitting domestic measures de­
signed to compensate for different levels of environmental regulations will un­
dermine differences in comparative advantage resulting from sovereign policy 
choices and constitute a form of meddling in states' environmental policies. See 
generally Esty, supra note 1 19, at 1261-62 (providing a general summary of 
trade-oriented concerns about environmental regulation) . 
There is also a concern that trade related environmental protection is not 
the optimal tool for environmental protection, threatening to introduce new 
and unproductive sources of conflict mto an already contentious trade commu­
nity wtth little to show for it in either environmental protection or trade en­
hancement. See Roessler, supra note 2, at 228. 
12 1  Advocates of a human ethical obligation to protect the environment 
have done so on a variety of �rounds. See generally RODERlCK F. NASH, THE 
RIGHTS OF NATURE 121-60 (1989) (reviewing the historical development of 
ethical theories affording rights to non-humans and the natural world) . 
122 The classical concept of justice employed here-justice as Right Order­
typically envisions Right Order as right relationships among human beings. 
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The trade and environment debate does, in fact, raise issues 
which can be considered to be justice issues, or issues involving 
Right Order decisions . First, the broad Platonic vision of justice 
as Right Order could be construed to include efforts to order the 
relationships between human beings and the natural world ac­
cording to what is Right. 123 Debates over the acceptable limits of 
accommodation of one's ethical obligation to the environment in 
the face of competing economic interests presuppose such an ex­
tension. These debates also reflect a divergence between conse­
quentialist approaches to this issue, such as utilitarianism, which 
can justify no link at all or a weak or flexible one, 124 and non­
consequentialist forms of moral reasoning, such as Kantian moral­
ity and other forms of egalitarian liberalism, which reject this sort 
of reasoning where ethical obligations to the environment are 
concerned. For example, Richard Stewart argues that in evaluat­
ing the competing interests at stake in the trade and environment 
linkage, a utilitarian analysis based on Mill is more effective rather 
than non-consequentialist forms of analysis, a position challenged 
by Robert Housman explicitly on Kantian grounds. 125 
Second, public decisions concerning environmental protection 
can be seen as Aristotelian allocations of social benefits and bur­
dens, in that such decisions inevitably involve the allocation of 
rights and duties involving the scope of permitted environmental 
activity. The "Environmental Justice" movement adopts this ap­
proach, examining the extent to which the burdens of environ­
mental regulation, and the costs of environmental degradation, 
One may well ask if our obligation to act justly embraces duties to non-human 
entities such as plant or animal species or ecosystems. 
123 The effort to structure the human-nature relationship according to a 
recognition or grant of legal rights in the natural world would be one example 
of this view. See generally CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE 
STANDING? (1996) . 
124 Consequentialist moral theories judge the morality of actions solely ac­
cording to the nature of their consequences. See ALAN DONAGAN, THE 
THEORY OF MORALITY 190 (1977) . Utilitarianism is its "most persuasive and 
most thoroughly investigated variety."  !d. at 192. 
125 See Robert F. Housman, A Kantian Approach to Trade and the Environ­
ment, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1376-77 (1992) ; Richard B. Stewart ,lnter­
national Trade and Environment: Lessons From the Federal Experience, 49 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1329, 1332 (1992) . Cf Holly Doremus, Patching the A rk: Im­
proving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 1 8  ECOLOGY L .Q.  265, 275-8 1 
(1991) (arguing that utilitarian and deontological arguments for preservation of 
biological diversity differ in the scope of effective protection they justify) . 
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are disproportionately borne by the disadvantaged, and treatmg 
this as a problem of distributive justice . 126 
The trade and human rights debate also raises difficult justice 
problems. They are justice problems because they involve the al­
location of basic social goods such as rights, which in our tradi­
tion are perhaps the most highly valued of all social goods. They 
are difficult because they arise in a context of conflict over fun­
damental values, as revealed by different states ' conceptions of in­
dividual and 2:roup rights, 127 and different accounts of the place of 
h . h 1 18 d h . h fl" 1 29 sue ng ts, an t e appropnate response to sue con1 1cts, 
within international economic law. 
More specifically, the trade and human rights linkage involves 
a debate over the effects of trade and trade law on the allocation 
of human rights and on their effectiveness. 130 The most contro-
126 See generally Gerald Torres, Environmental justice: The Legal Meaning of 
a Social Movement, 1 5  J.L. & CoM. 597 (1996) (surveying history of and objec­
tions to the environmental justice concept) . 
127 A key aspect of Western conceptions of justice is respect for fundamen­
tal human rights. This commitment IS the basts for the tremendous post-war 
develofment of human rights protection within public international law. But 
not al trading states share die same conception of human rights, whether 
within the Western tradition or outside of it, and not all trading states share the 
same view of how differences in human rights and the values they reflect should 
be i�nored, accommodated or challenged in international economic relations. 28 There is some consensus concerning a core of individual economic 
rights such as labor and employment rights, but no consensus as to how such 
rights should be taken into account in trade relationships. See WTO Singapore 
Ministerial Declaration, WT /MIN(96)/DEC/W (Dec. 13 ,  1996) ;  36  I.L.M. 2 1 8  
(1997) (providing that the WTO affirms commitment to international labor 
standards but eschews jurisdiction over trade and labor issues, suggesting ILO as 
forum) . There is even less consensus with respect to non-economic human 
rights and how such rights should figure into trade and integration systems. See 
Stirling, supra note 2, at 1 ,  8-13 ,  39-40. 
129 Stirling notes that trade sanctions, paradoxically, are in principle the 
most effective, and, in practice, often the least effective means of enforcmg hu­
man rights, as their use is often resented by the target state and is at the same 
time the subject of political manipulation by interest groups in sanctioning 
states. See id. at 2-3 . 
130 Trade agreements can require as a precondition a strengthened rule of 
law within the trading partners' society, which can have an indirect systemic 
effect on improving rights protection. Second, specific economically-related 
rights such as the property rights of innovators can be linked to trade conces­
sions. Third, trade concessions can be used as incentives to reward progressive 
democratic governments, which can secure human rights reforms and even cre­
ate more of a ground-swell for further reform. Fourth, trade sanctions can be 
used as a weapon for ensuring compliance with human rights obligations 
stemming from other non-economic agreements. Finally, the juridical aspect of 
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versial form of trade-human rights linkage is the use of trade sanc­
tions as a weapon for ensuring compliance with human ri�hts ob­
ligations stemming from other non-economic agreements.  3 1 Are 
we morally obligated to use trade agreements or trade concessions 
to punish human rights violators through economic sanctions for 
noncompliance with human rights conventions? At a minimum, 
are we obligated to refrain from granting them trade concessions? 
Is this a right use of trade? 
First, consider the position against linkage, namely that trade 
relationships with human rights violators ought to continue un­
abated. It is not difficult to see why this course of conduct would 
be considered morally questionable on its face, in that continued 
trade has at least the appearance of contributing to the wealth and 
economic power of the violators and, in fact, may lead directly to 
their ability to carry out their repressive practices. 132 This view, 
however, can be justified on several grounds. A utilitarian has no 
difficulty in supporting relatively unrestricted trade, if he or she is 
convinced that the best road towards fuller rights protection in 
the future is a moderately repressive open market regime in the 
short term, or a policy of constructive engagement, as the Clinton 
administration adopted in its China decision. 133 A utilitarian can 
also justify completely unrestricted trade, on the grounds that 
trade flows best when it flows freest, and future general welfare 
increases are the best road to human rights. 
In contrast, both egalitarian and libertarian approaches would 
be opposed to a utilitarian analysis, measuring as it does the utility 
of rights protection abroad, and our trade-related measures for 
enhancing it, against the utility of permitting or ignoring rights 
violations abroad, or of refraining from the potential domestic 
trade agreements and integration systems, to the extent they themselves reflect 
fundamental concepts of justice such as democratic participation and the rule of 
law, can also strengthen the human rights climate in international law. 
1 3 1  See id. at 42-45 (noting that a properly designed sanctions re_gime can be 
an effective human rights tool) ;  Alston, supra note 1 12 ,  at 1 68-69 (noting that 
the relative inefficacy of sanctions argues for more constructive system of ex 
ante incentives) . 
1 32 Witness the speed with which military equipment and military-oriented 
exports are suspended even where the general link to human rights is resisted. 
133 See Randall Green, Human R ights and Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Rates 
for Product from the People's Republic of China, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 
61 1  (1994) (arguing that supporting economic development in China through 
MFN and other policies is the best way to promote human rights in China) . 
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trade-related costs of trade-oriented rights measures. 134 As with 
the trade and environment linkage, the struggle underlying the 
trade-human rights linkage may be between utilitarian approaches 
to this issue, which can justify no link at all or a weak or flexible 
one, and non-consequentialist forms of moral reasoning, such as 
Kantian morality and other forms of egalitarian liberalism, which . h" f . h h . h d 135 reJect t IS sort o reasonmg w ere uman ng ts are concerne . 
As with the trade and inequality link, the trade and human rights 
link forces us to consider the consistency of our commitments, 
specifically whether one can be an egalitarian liberal or libertarian 
as far as rights issues at home go, and a utilitarian on rights issues 
abroad. 
3. 2. Changing the Linkage Discourse 
Despite the justice implications of the linkages discussed 
above, linkage issues may not always be approached or even rec­
ognized as justice questions. The dominant perspective of both 
sides to any linkage issues tends towards what can be character­
ized as the External View, in which each opposing camp on the 
linkage issue views the other camps' claims and modes of analysis 
as external to its own concerns and commitments . Within the 
trade policy side, the External View is best represented by those 
adhering to the Efficiency Model, trade theorists who view trade 
law principally in economic terms as a matter of enhancing effi­
ciency and the general welfare. 136 From the viewpoint of Effi­
ciency Model adherents, the non-trade camp is seen as trying to 
get in the way or "gum up the works" with what are at best ex­
traneous concerns such as human rights or environmental protec-
134 One might even see a curious alignment between egalitarian and liber­
tarian views on this point, as both theories place a fundamental emphasis on 
individual rights and their protection as a cornerstone of a just society. 
135 See Tes6n, supra note 61 ,  at 64-65. 
136 Adam Smith is the classical exponent of the view that the unimpeded 
free market is the best guarantor of ultimate economic well-being. See KELLY, 
supra note 63, at 303; SMITH, supra note 103 ;  see also JACKSON, supra note 89, at 
8-9 (naming efficiency-based increases in general welfare as the pre-eminent goal 
of trade law) ;  Robert E. Hudec, GA IT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade 
Measures Against Foreign Environmental Practices, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND 
HARMONIZATION, supra note 2, at 95, 108 ("The GATT's economic goal is to 
promote, through liberal international trade policies, the greater effectiveness of 
national economies .") . 
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. 1 37 d h b . 1 . . 1 3 8  Th twn, an w at may e at worst s1mp e protectwmsm. e 
non-trade side of the External View can be represented by the 
"Green'' movement in international trade, for whom the interna­
tional economic law regime is seen as adversely affecting its efforts 
to establish their vision of a just order with regard to the envi-
1 39 ronment . 
Recognizing trade linkage questions as justice questions inevi­
tably changes our approach to the trade linkage debates. First of 
all, regarding the framework of the debate, the External view be­
comes ultimately untenable, because trade policy cannot be con­
sidered as independent of the concerns raised by the various trade 
linkage debates. The alternative, or "Integrated View," suggested 
by a justice perspective requires recognition of the fact that con­
flicts between traditional trade policy and other areas of social 
policy involve branches of the same tree, and that this tree is the · f . . 140 E . 1 d h constructiOn o a JUSt society. nv1ronmenta an uman 
rights advocates, for example, cannot be viewed as bounders or 
gate crashers at the trade policy party. Rather, they raise funda­
mental questions that are inescapable within trade policy, for they 
raise questions of justice, and trade policy exists and operates 
within the larger inquiry as to justice. 
137 See Charnovitz, supra note 3 ,  at 23 (citing objection by GATT and 
WTO members to efforts in 1991 and 1994 to begin work on labor and envi­
ronment issues, on the basis that such issues were not "trade issue[s]") ; Hudec, 
supra note 136 (arguing that GATT has a good reason to be skeptical of linkage 
claims) . 
138 See Charnovitz, supra note 3 ,  at 32 ("Simplistic demands for drastic 
trade remedies against so-called eco-dumping or soc1al dumping sometimes bear 
a striking similarity to more conventional forms of protecuonist rhetoric . . . .  ") 
(citin� then-GATT Director General , Peter Sutherland) . 
13 The outcry over the GATT Tuna-Dolphin dispute is a classic example 
of this framework, in which the trade community's rules and fora are viewed 
by the environmentalists as serious obstacles to the accomplishment of their 
objectives, in that case the protection of dolphins through the United States 
Marine Mammal Protection Act . See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Oct .  30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 1 87; GA 7T Dispute Settlement Panel 
Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, supra note 1 17. See generally 
James Cameron, The GA 7T and the Environment, in PHILLIPE SANDS, 
GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 100, 100-21 (1994) . 
1 40 Recognizing the link between trade and justice means a recognition by 
linkage partisans that their common search for justice binds them far more than 
their different views divide them, and that each side is engaged in a search for 
justice, and seeks to enact their vision of it in a given area of social concern. 
The problem, of course, is that those areas of soc1al concern, in fact, overlap, 
and each community may have conflicting visions of the Right Order and con­
flicting criteria of justification of justice. 
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Second, in answering linkage questions, we must consider the 
implications of our various substantive theories of justice on each 
of these issues . The fact that they are justice questions means that 
the debate and resolution of trade linkage issues must include 
comprehensive and systematic normative analysis, which is an es­
sential part of how we answer any question involving social goals 
and social values. 141  From a justice perspective, linkage debates 
are not merely disputes over the accommodation by trade policy 
of exogamous priorities, but rather involve disagreements at the 
level of normative theory, over the proper construction of a just 
society. Particular linkages such as "trade and inequality,"  "trade 
and human rights," and "trade and the environment" present a se­
ries of debates within and among substantive theories of justice, 
and concerning the relationship of international economic law to 
justice. The fact that there is disagreement reveals that ,  with re­
gard to each particular area of social concern, we lack consensus as 
to what, precisely, the Right Order should be. 142 
Rendering such normative conflicts more transparent is all the 
more critical in view of the fact that the Efficiency Model would, 
at first glance, seem to stand outside the Justice question, suggest­
ing explicitly or implicitly that it takes no position on justice 
questions, and that considerations of justice (often read as distri­
butional equity) have no place in trade law so understood. 143 This 
Article has argued that trade linkage questions cannot be defini­
tively resolved a-normatively, and that it is an error of the Effi-
14 1 See Charnovitz, supra note 3 ,  at 21 (noting that one similarity between 
environmental and labor issues in trade is that "[m]orality has always been a 
concern with labour(sic] and is becoming increasingly so with the environ­
ment") . There are, of course, other ways of analyzing these issues which are 
equallY,: important, such as the descriptive and prescriptive modes of the social 
sctenufic tradition, which can complement, but not replace, a normative analy­
sis or a normative answer. 
142 Circumstances have changed; technology has advanced; international 
economic law has developed; fundamental values are in conflict; and the range 
of options for "rightly ordering" each of these corners of society is represented 
more fully by the views of th.e trade and non-trade partisans taken together, 
than by etther side separately. 
143 Trade law, on this view, is about comparative advantage, efficiency, and 
welfare. See, e.g. , Ronald Brand, Sustaining the Development of International 
Trade Law, 2 1 VT. L. REV. 823, 842 (1997) ("The fundamental goal of the WTO 
system is the reduction of trade barriers through rules consistent with the un­
derlying theory of comparative advantage. ") .  
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ciency Model to consider itself a convenient , neutral manner in 
which to resolve these issues . There is no such stance. 144 
In fact, when one considers the question of justice and its rela­
tion to international economic law, as outlined above, one is im­
mediately struck by the fact that the Efficiency Model of interna­
tional economic law is actually one response to the question of 
what constitutes the Right Order. 145 On this view of interna­
tional economic relations, justice is best served through a system 
of international economic law that promotes free market ex­
changes among private parties and within the state "market" for 
trade agreements. Such market exchanges will promote effi­
ciency, enable comparative advantage to operate, and enhance the 
general welfare of the market participants. 146 Neoliberal eco­
nomic arguments against linkages thus presuppose a substantive 
theory of justice. They are not neutral arguments to preserve 
trade policy from unwarranted normative baggage, but rather 
normative arguments towards a different vision of the Right Or-
d 1 47 er. 
144  Trade linkage issues thus flush the neo-liberal economic trade viewpoint 
out of its assumed neutrality and into the mudpit of normative brawling, where 
it belongs. 
145 Put another way, Efficiency Model advocates rely on the positive analy­
sis of economists while ignoring the normative aspects of economic theory, 
which I?�dern econo.�ists themselves take little cognizanc� of d�spite a histori­cal trad1t1on of theonzmg as to the proper ends of econom1c act1v1ty. See EDW. 
E. ZAJAC, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FAIRNESS 69-78 (1995) ;  Daniel M. 
Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and Con­
temporary Moral Philosophy, 3 1  T.  ECON. LIT. 671 ,  675-76, 677-78 (citing the 
moral presuppositions and implications of welfare economics, and the mter­
minp,ling of positive and normative analysis in such economics). 
46 This view may reflect the conclusion that the only professional contri­
bution economists can make to the justice debate is analysts of what contributes 
to these modest but necessary ingredients in a just society. In that case, the po­
sition is consistent with modern economics' eschewal of ethical theory beyond 
their own methodological limits. See ZAJAC, supra note 145, at 76-77; Hausman 
& McPher�on, surra note 145, at 67.1-78 (citing !llodern economists' relative ig­
norance ot mora theory, and argmng for the 1mportance of moral theory to 
effective economic analysis). However, it must oe recognized that efficiency 
and welfare, while arguably necessary, are not sufficient, in themselves, to ex­
press all our intuitions about just outcomes. 
Alternatively, to the extent that this view is an assertion that efficiency is a 
sufficient justification of outcomes, it runs counter to most liberal theory and 
ignores the significant distributional issues raised by economic activity. See 
Z.-\]AC, supra note 145, at 77. 
147 The claims of justice, be it libertarian justice or utilitarian justice, are 
satisfied on this view solely through maximizmg individual economic liberty 
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Finally, the articulation of trade linkage positions, in terms of 
substantive theories of justice, makes it  possible to recognize po­
tentially useful areas of agreement on a normative level among 
differing linkage views . At its most basic level, international eco­
nomic law and policy can be seen as committed to and advancing 
key tenets of Western theories of justice in the area of economic 
relations. For example, the core values of free trade and economic 
integration (increases in general welfare through trade liberaliza­
tion, nondiscrimination, and the implementation of treaty-based 
regulatory schemes) reflect core principles of a liberal theory of 
justice such as liberty, equality of opportunity, and the rule of 
law. 148 Thus, Efficiency Paradigm advocates and those with other 
linkage viewpoints can find common ground, for example, in 
trade linkage approaches that advocate measures which strengthen 
the rule of law and the effectiveness of institutions in interna­
tional economic relations as part of a linkage scheme. 
3.3. Towards a just Resolution of Trade Linkage Issues 
Recognizing the link between trade linkage issues and justice 
can also contribute to a more just resolution of those linkage is­
sues. It becomes possible to evaluate techniques and options for 
resolving linkage conflicts in an analytic framework that draws 
out their underlying normative commitments and implications . 
Various trade policy mechanisms have been developed by states 
and international economic institutions for managing conflicts 
among linkage areas. 1 49 Efficiency alone is an inadequate basis on 
which to formulate policy in areas which involve so many inter­
ests, costs, risks, and opportunities. 15° Furthermore, trade linkage 
and minimizing governmental interference with market decisions, eschewing 
the distributive or social justice contentions of liberal egalitarian justice. 148 Cf Petersmann, supra note 89, at 406 ("[I]ndividual liberties and action­
able property rights are preconditions for the proper functioning of eco­
nomic . . .  markets, and for maximization of individual autonomy, human well­
bein�, economic efficiency and social welfare in a free society."). 
1 9 The current trade linkage debate is dominated by a bewildering variety 
of issues and techniques, including rule-making issues such as harmonization, 
domestic versus multilateral standards, and priority schemes for rule conflicts; 
enforcement issues such as admission criteria, conditionality, suspension of 
concessions and trade sanctions; and institutional issues including jurisdiction, 
com�etence, participation by NGOs, debates over decision-making criteria. 
0 See Dunoff, supra note 94; Nichols, supra note 7, at 707 ("[T]he multi­
tude of efficient states cannot be narrowed to one by excising all goals except 
maximization of monetary wealth.") .  
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issues can not be resolved solely at the level of a choice of techni­
cal or doctrinal tools . Techniques to manage these issues involve 
prioritizing between certain trade liberalization values and other 
aspects of the liberal view of justice, such as human rights. As 
such, they contain deeply embedded normative assumptions, 
which must be addressed as such. 15 1 A justice perspective may 
thus serve both to put the quest for efficiency within a larger 
normative context and to supplement this line of inquiry with a 
more adequate framework for policy formulation. 
One principal practical implication of a normative analysis of 
trade linkage techniques would be that certain existing policies or 
practices now considered to be discretionary on the part of the 
implementing state could come to be seen as in fact obligatory, on 
the basis of that state's moral obligations to its trading partners. 
For example, in the trade and development area the principle of 
asymmetry or preferential treatment for developing countries is a 
principal instrument in managing inequality problems, and is as 
old as the GATT system. 152 However, much of the trade between 
developed and developing countries is conducted under some 
form of unilateral trade preference program 153 which disfavors to 
some degree exports of manufactured goods which are direct� 
competitive with the manufactured goods of developed states. 1 4 
15 1  What is lacking today is a comprehensive analysis from the/erspective 
of the developed states of the ethical relationship between develope and devel­
oping states, and the articulation of the implications of such an analysis for the 
current trading system. This lack of consensus reflects debates, within the 
West, on justice itself, as well as the debate within trade law between the Effi­
ciencz Model and other models of economic justice. 1 2 The Havana Charter contained extensive provisions detailing preferen­
tial treatment for industrializing developing countries. See Brown, supra note 2, 
at 358-59. Unfortunately, the Havana Ch.arter never went into force; the re­
sulting GATT had a much weaker regime for developing countries; and the 
amendments adding part IV, in 1966, dia not fully remedy the situation .  See id. 
at 359. 
153  In 1971 ,  the GATT Contracting Parties approved a waiver authorizing, 
but not requiring, developed states to extend preferential tariff rates to develop­
ing country exports on a non-reciprocal basis for ten years . In 1979, the waiver for the resulting Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") was made perma­
nent . See id. at 362-63 . Most developed countries have some form of GSP pro­
gram, including members of the European Community and the United States. 
See, e-§" ,  19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1994) .  
1 5  Despite its widespread implementation, the GSP effort is widely judged 
a failure, as most often the exports of greatest interest to developing countries 
are not covered, and the complexity and discretionary nature of the program 
undermine its utility. See generally Brown, supra note 2, at 362-63. 
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It may be that under some form of redistributive or feminist the­
ory of justice one could articulate a moral obligation to permit 
the preferential export of competitive goods . 155 Justice may also 
require that such discretionary unilateral preferences be sup­
planted by nondiscretionary bilateral treaty commitments for 
f . 1 1 56 h . h d' . d pre erentla treatment, toget er Wit non- 1scretwnary tra e-
related development aid, and other ways of recognizing inequality 
. d 1 . h' 157 m tra e re atlons 1ps. 
A second, related effect would be that certain existing linkage 
tools now considered legitimate, even attractive, might come to 
be seen as unattractive or even unjust if normatively reevalu­
ated. 158 For example, one linkage tool often employed and advo­
cated in the human rights and environment debates is the practice 
of trade conditionality, which in this context means linking trade 
preferences and other advantageous trade treatment with adher­
ence to certain values as reflected in agpropriate treaties involving 
the environment, human rights, etc. 1 This approach is popular 
155 For example, under the Rawlsian difference principle inequalities are to 
be justified by their working to the advantage of the least favored, which would 
mean, in this instance, that preferential or unequal trade treatment must be 
structured to favor the interests of developing country exporters over devel­
oped country competitors. 
The ethic of care articulated by feminist philosophers, as applied to inter­
national relations, might require a similar result . See Charlesworth et al., supra 
note 1 1 1 , at 615-16 .  
156 Such a transition can play an important interim role in an evolving 
process of regional integration. See Frank J. Garcia, "America 's Agreements"­
A n  Interim Stage in Building the Free Trade A rea of the A mericas, 3 5  COLUM. J .  
TRANSNAT'L L.  63 , at 98- 106 (1997) . 
157 See Bernard Cullen, Philosophical Theories of Justice, in JUSTICE: IN­
TERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 28 (describing Barry's notion 
that justice might require a non-discretionary system of interstate development 
aid) . 
158 One broad, systemic effect of a justice perspective on linkage issues 
might be the elimination of certain options on die basis of a widespread rejec­
tion of utilitarianism or consequentialtsm generally. 
159 One example of this practice is the requirement that EC member and 
associated states be parties to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom. See Smith, supra note 2, at 808-09. 
Therefore, tf a state is to participate in European integration, it must recognize 
certain human rights norms. The China MFN debate is a key example of this 
issue, and of the failure of the Clinton administration to follow through on its 
initial impetus to recognize and respect this link. See Robert S. Greenberger, 
Restraint of Trade: Cacophony of Voices Drowns Out Message From U.S. to China, 
WALL ST . J. ,  Mar. 22, 1994, at Al .  As a result, the liberal view of a just society 
becomes further fragmented. 
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with non-trade interest groups, as it suggests in the strongest pos­
sible terms the conditioning state's commitment to the relevant 
aspect of justice linked to the trade benefits in question. 160 This 
approach is equally unpopular with the neoliberally-oriented 
trade community, which sees such efforts as a serious threat to the 
fundamental economic principles of trade theory and a stalking 
horse for arbitrary discrimination. 
The issue of trade conditionality is ideally suited for analysis 
from a justice perspective. On this issue, the neoliberal economic 
view of justice militates against conditionality on trade economic 
grounds, but has no answer when faced with the assertion that 
such a position undermines other commitments stemming equally 
from a liberal view of justice, in that it enriches states pursuing 
values contrary to our own. However, the facially liberal argu­
ment in favor of conditionality seems to ignore that ,  at least with 
respect to developing countries (often the most popular targets for 
conditionality due to their relative vulnerability) , a wealthy state 
might be under a moral duty to give preferential trade treatment 
and even direct aid that might preclude conditionality altogether. 
In other words, if justice requires that wealthy states assist the de­
velopment of poorer states through trade preferences and outright 
wealth transfers, then conditionality would be a violation of that 
moral duty] regardless of its possible advantages in the pursuit of 
h . 161  ot er atms. 
The trade and environment link in particular has highlighted a 
third area in which a justice perspective may have practical impli­
cations, namely the issue of determining the proper forum and 
decisional criteria for the institutional resolution of trade linkage 
conflicts. 1 62 Institutional dispute settlement bodies confronted 
160 See, e.g:., Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 22 (citing conditionality practices 
with approval) . 
16 1 Certain conditions tied to ensuring that the aid go where it is intended, 
i.e., to benefit the lot of the poorest, might, of course, be justifiable. However, 
links to rights not implicated in the subJect of the aid (free speech or free emi­
gration rights, for exam2le) would not be justifiable, because they presume dis­
cretion over the grant of assistance where that grant might, in fact, be a moral 
obliftation. 62 Environmentalists roundly criticized the GATT decision-making proc­
ess in the first Tuna-Dolphin case, United States-Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna, 30 _I.L.M.- 1 594 (�991) , in which the fir�t . �xplicit trade lin�age issues W<l;S resolved m an mternatwna1 legal forum, for ta1lmg to take cogmzance of envl­
ronmental policy issues and for clumsily handling these matters in a piecemeal 
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with linkage issues must be capable of making decisions that ad­
dress the wide range of social values at stake. 163 To date, the 
GATT, as a principal trade-based forum for handling linkage is­
sues, has not passed the test, at least in the view of non-trade link-. 1 64 age mterest groups. 
As a threshold matter, justice might require for example that 
the forum chosen be one which most closely embodies our proce­
dural standards for just decision making and dispute resolution. 165 
In this respect, one key aspect already prominent in trade policy 
debates is participation by interest groups, an issue with clear 
f d . h 166 0 h . . . overtones o emocratlc t eory. nee sue mstltutwns are 
chosen, a justice perspective requires a careful analysis of the prin­
ciples and criteria employed in making decisions involving link­
age issues. 167 Normative preferences which may well predeter­
mine the outcome of linkage decisions are likely to be embedded 
fa<>hion. See, e.g. , Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defog­
ging the Debate, 27 CORNELL lNT'L L.J .  459 (1994) .  
163 As Joel T rachtman writes, "[N]o society can afford to make decisions in 
an unintegrated fashion." Trachtman, supra note 5, at 57. The risks for institu­
tions such as the WTO in ignoring the fundamental values at stake in their de­
cisions are highlighted by Philip Nichols in Trade Without Values. See Nichols, 
supra note 7, at 702-07. 
164 See, e.g. , ESTY, supra note 2, at 1268. 
[T]he GATT stands as one of the most successful international organi­
zations ever created. But the GA TT's legitimacy does not translate out 
of the trade context, and the organization has little credibility in envi­
ronmental matters. When a case involves mixed issues of 'trade and 
environment, '  the GATT does not offer a suitable forum for resolu­
tion of the dispute, as the institution lacks the expertise and neutrality 
to balance trade and environmental J?Olicies. The GATT's perceived 
lack of technical capacity and neutralny, and therefore legitimacy, as a 
decision-making body in the environmental realm presents a nearly in­
surmountable obstacle to peace in the war between environmentalists 
and free traders. 
!d. But see Stewart, supra note 125, at 1349 ("While amendments to the GATT 
to deal more specifically with trade and environment issues may well be desir­
able, the current GATT text provides sufficient flexibility to afford environ­
mental values equal footing w.lth free trade values .") .  
165 See Petersmann, supra note 89. 
166 See Robert F. Housman, Democratizing International Trade Decision­
Making, 27 CORNELL lNT'L L.J. 699 (1994) . 
167 See generally Joel P. Trachtman, "Trade and . . .  " Problems, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis and Subsidiarity, 9 EUR. J .  lNT'L L. 32 (1997) . 
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• · · 1 6 8  F 1 . h b d h . ' in such cntena. or examp e, 1t as een argue t.1 at m tne 
analysis of GATT dispute settlement involving trade-environment 
issues, certain criteria such as "proof of endangerment" mask utili­
tarian assumptions tending to favor pro-trade outcomes to such . 169 -d1sputes . 
4. CONCLUSION 
In any successful revolution, there comes a moment of truth 
when the former revolutionaries must finally confront the chal­
lenge of governance, and the international economic law revoiu­
tion is no different. The trade linkage phenomenon, in particular, 
is forcing international economic law to wrestle with its own 
normative assumptions and implications across a broad range of 
issues.  One should expect no less of a system of governance that 
so promises to affect all aspects of global social policy. 
Successfully managing trade linkage issues means, for the trade 
policy community, accepting that the linkages come from within 
and not from without. Even if one maintains the neoliberal eco­
nomic view of justice in international economic law, it must at 
least be conceded that advocates of linkage issues are acting from 
other answers to the same question, the question of justice, and 
that it is a shared question. 
Furthermore, the resolution of linkage issues cannot be sought 
exclusively on the doctrinal level. The resolution needs to be ar­
ticulated normatively, as an attempt to resolve dilemmas and ten­
sions within the liberal vision, and between liberalism and other 
candidates for Right Order. From the perspective of justice, the 
debate within international economic law over linkage issues re­
flects debates within various aspects of Western moral and politi­
cal theory, and especially within liberalism itself. It reflects ten­
sions between the liberalization of individual choice through free 
trade and investment, and the commitment to individual rights 
and other fundamental moral obligations expressed in other as-
168 See Nichols, supra note 7, at 700-01 (reviewing factors in GATT dispute 
settlement panel doctrine giving primacy to trade in conflicts with other val­
ues) . 
169 "Endangerment" implies that there is no harm short of dire peril that 
could justify interference with economically lucrative activity, ignoring the 
possibility that any harm, for example, justifies such interference. See 
Housman, supra note 125, at 1 376-77 (challenging Stewart) . 
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pects of liberalism, such as human rights and environmental pro­
tectwn. 
The ideal solution would be consensus on the question of 
what justice demands in the case of international economic law 
generally, and for each linkage area in question. Absent that, one 
must resort to legal techniques for managing linkages where con­
sensus is not achieved, but always with the understanding that 
one is mediating local conflicts within an overall search for jus­
tice. 
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